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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2006).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No, 1: Whether the District Court erred in its determination that Plaintiffs
met their burden to prove all of the elements required to give rise to .1 dedication JIHJ
abandonment of private property for a public highway under the governing statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 72-5-104, by competent, clear and convincing evidence.
Standard of Review: All elements required for the dedication nn1 ,il tndonntent
of private property for a public highway must be proven by the plaintiff by clear and
convincing evidence. E.g., Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 379, 438 P.2d 545, 547
(1968). The ultimate determination of whether the facts meet the sttiluloi \ definition of a
public highway "is a mixed question of fact and law," which the appellate court reviews
"for correctness." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997).
Additionally, since the District Court decided this case on ^immar> judgment, the
appellate court must "review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for correctness and
afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95 5, 61
P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 1 IT
100, Tf 9, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted).
Demonstration that Issue No. 1 Was Preserved in the District Court: The
attorneys who represented Dixie Riding Club, Inc. ("Dixie") in the summary judgment
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proceedings below argued, for example, in Dixie's summary judgment reply
memorandum, that "Plaintiffs (sic) have a burden with clear and convincing evidence to
establish, under the mandates of § 72-5-104(1), that the private property of the
Defendant's (sic) should now be declared a public roadway. This Honorable Court
should see that this burden cannot be met[.]" (R. 289 (Dixie's Reply)).

Issue No. 2: Whether the District Court erred in failing to assess the reasonable
and necessary width of any public highway, even if any public highway was properly
found to exist (which Dixie denies).
Standard of Review: Plain error. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3)(2005) (stating
width of a public thoroughfare dedicated under governing statute "is that which is
reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances");
Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("even if a public thoroughfare
was created, the District Court erred in failing to assess the reasonable and necessary
width of the roadway") (emphasis added).
Statement of Grounds for Seeking Review on Issue No, 2: Plaintiffs failed to
provide for the District Court any evidence at all regarding the reasonable and necessary
width of any public highway. The District Court therefore had no basis to, could not, and
did not conduct any assessment of the reasonable and necessary width of any public
highway as is required by the governing Utah statute and case law. It therefore was plain
error for the District Court to dedicate a fifty-foot wide swath of Dixie's property as a
public highway, particularly where there was no evidence of any use of such width.
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Issue No. 3: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in ruling that all
facts set forth by Plaintiffs in support of their cross-motion for summary judgment were
deemed admitted by Dixie, purportedly because Dixie did not separately list and quote
verbatim Plaintiffs' fact claims that were disputed by Dixie, even though Dixie filed
affidavits and memoranda opposing and disputing material facts.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr.,
Inc., 2004 UT App 354,ffi[13-15, 101 P.3d 371, 375-76.
Statement of Grounds for Seeking Review on Issue No. 3: This abuse of
discretion did not become apparent uniiii aita the unniriary jun^meni briefing was
completed and the District Court issued its ruling based upon and chiding Dixie's then
attorneys for this issue. Since Dixie's memoranda discussed and was supported by facts
set forth by affidavit, the District Cnurf s abandonment of Dixie's property as a public
highway was an abuse of discretion, and is appropriate for this Court's review.

:

"' Issue No. 4: Whether the District Court improperly engaged in a weighing of •

disputed facts and evidence on summary judgment.
Standard of Review: "Summary judgment is proper only when 'there is no
'genuine issue as to any material fact and

the mo\ ing party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.' Utah R, Civ. P. 56(c). 'In determining whether the lower court correctly
found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts and inferences to
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party,' In other words, 'we
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review the factual submissions to the District Court in a light most favorable to finding a
material issue of fact.' Moreover, c[i]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we
accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review them for
correctness.'" Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations
omitted).
Demonstration that Issue No. 4 Was Preserved in the District Court: Dixie
submitted to the District Court affidavits disputing the claimed facts set forth by Plaintiffs
in support of their motion, and argued those disputed facts in opposition to Plaintiffs'
motion. The District Court's statement in its ruling drawing a contrast between the
parties' respective summary judgment materials and noting that Plaintiffs' materials
struck the court as "clearly more detailed and analytical," (R. 309, Ruling n.l), shows an
improper weighing of evidence on summary judgment appropriate for this Court to
review. This abuse of discretion did not become apparent until after the summary
judgment briefing was completed and the District Court issued its ruling.

Issue No. 5: Whether the District Court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs have
standing to maintain this action, misstating the standing argument as whether private
citizens may rely upon Utah Code § 72-5-104, where the standing issue actually pertains
to whether the claimed evidence of use that was presented to the District Court was use
by the "public" sufficient under the statute, or merely use by private parties and
neighboring property owners that as a matter of law cannot create a public highway
dedication.
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Standard of Review: "We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002
UT 9b 1| 5, 6: P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v Outdoor Endeavors
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, ^ 9, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted).
Demonstration that Issue No. 5 Was Preserved in the District Court: Dixie's
attorneys below argued, for example, in Dixie's opening summary judgment
memorandum, that "[t]he first issue is that the Plaintiffs (sic), each and every one of
them, or (sic) in fact individuals, and are not members of any body politic entitled to
pursue a dedicated road on behalf of the City of St. George" (R. 130); "private persons
are seeking to deprive the Plaintiffs (sic) of theit property willi no slanding In do so"
(R. 135); and "Plaintiffs (sic) by seeking to have property dedicated, paid for, and taxes
having been rendered, declared a public thoroughfare, these Plaintiffs (sic) are, in
essence, claiming to privately act on behalf of the public*

i ing no standing i<> j mrsue

the rights of the City of St. George." (R. 135-36).

Issue No. b: Whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred for failuir fi i n.nne llic < \V\ nt
St. George as a necessary and indispensable party, where the evidence presented to the
District Court by Plaintiffs (which Dixie does not admit) claiming the disputed alleged
roadway at issue may have been either owned by oi subject ( in easement in Li\< i ul 1 lie
city of St. George. The effect of Plaintiffs' claims in this case and the District Court's
Decree of Dedication were to declare property and property rights purportedly owned by
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the city of St. George to have been abandoned to the state, without Plaintiffs naming St.
George as a party to this case.
Standard of Review: Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a
person or entity who claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the action whose
interests may be affected by the outcome of the case "shall" be joined as parties to the
action. Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' entitlement to judgment as a matter
of law to abandon property rights and interests Plaintiffs claim were owned by St.
George, without naming St. George as a party, should be reviewed for correctness and
afforded no deference. Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95 \ 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991.
Demonstration that Issue No. 6 Was Preserved in the District Court:
Plaintiffs themselves submitted evidence below claiming that the alleged roadway was
either owned by or subject to an easement in favor of St. George. (E.g., R. 171-72 (Aff.
of David Elwess, title searcher, *[fl[ 5 & 19 (discussing same)). Dixie objected below that
"[t]he City of St. George is a municipal corporation that is not a party to this lawsuit,"
despite Plaintiffs' claim that the City owns land which Plaintiffs seek to have dedicated
as a public highway. (R. 130 & 135-36).
Additionally, a party to a lawsuit may raise the issue of failure to join an
indispensable party at any time in the proceedings, including for the first time on appeal.
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Utah R. Civ.
P. 19(a).
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CONTROLLING STATUTE
Utah Code § 72-5-104 (2005): Public use concerning dedication — Scope
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period often years.
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by
the state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105,
and 72-5-103.
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and
necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and
circumstances.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This action was originally filed by Plaintiffs H. Val Hafen, Gilbert Jennings,

Mansfield Jennings, Conrad Bowler, and Lewis Bowler (collectively referred to herein a:
"Plaintiffs") on April 11, 2003. (R. 1-4.) The original complaint named David T.
Welch and John Does 1 through 20 as defendants and sought a declaratory judgment thai
a certain purported "roadway" was dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. On October 14, 2003, Plaintiffs moved to
amend their complaint, naming Dixie Riding Club ("Dixie") as defendant, removing
David T. Welch as defendant, adding Jennings Investment, LC as plaintiff, and adding a
cause of action for a prescriptive easement. (R. 61-63). The amendment was allowed
and Plaintiffs' "Second Amended Complaint" (there is no first amended complaint in the
record) was filed on October 29, 2003. (R. 77-83).
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Dixie moved for partial summary judgment ("Dixie's Motion") seeking dismissal
of Plaintiffs' public highway claim on January 14, 2005. Dixie's Motion was supported
by a memorandum of points and authorities and an Affidavit of Charles Welch. (R 127144).
Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment ("Plaintiffs5 CrossMotion") on March 9, 2005, along with a supporting memorandum and affidavits,
seeking an order dedicating as a public highway a portion of real property owned by
Dixie. (R. 139-285).
Dixie filed an Opposition to Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply
Brief to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion ("Dixie's Reply") with a second and supplemental
Affidavit of Charles Welch on April 28, 2005. (R. 286-292). Plaintiffs filed their final
reply brief ("Plaintiffs Reply") on July 11, 2005, (R. 293-301), and the parties' motions
were then submitted for decision on July 12, 2005. (R. 302-303).
On November 10, 2005, Fifth District Court Judge G. Rand Beacham held a
hearing on the parties' summary judgment motions. (R. 308). On January 12, 2006,
Judge Beacham entered his Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment, denying Dixie's
Motion and granting Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion. (R. 309-311.) On March 7, 2006, Judge
Beacham entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 319-337) and a Decree of
Dedication (R. 338-340), both of which were prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel.
Dixie filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court's decision on April 5, 2006.
(R. 377-378). Dixie's appeal ultimately was assigned to this Court.
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II.

Statement of Facts
a. Background Facts
1.

Dixie owns certain real property in Washington County, Utah (the "Dixie

Property"), upon which is located an equestrian arena that historically has been used for
rodeos and similar events. (R. 19 (Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaintffl[3 & 4);
R. 83 (Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint)).
2.

Plaintiffs claim that a purported "roadway" crosses the Dixie Property (the

"Alleged Roadway"), and that Plaintiffs and the general public have an interest in the
Alleged Roadway as a public highway or public thoroughfare. (R. 78-79 (Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaintffi[1 & 2)).
b. Facts Relating to Ownership of the Alleged Roadway.
3.

Plaintiffs allege that the Washington County Assessor recognized some

portion of the Alleged Roadway as a "public road," and that the Alleged Roadway had
not been carried under the Washington County tax rolls. (R. 80 (Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint at If 8).
4.

In the summary judgment proceedings below, Plaintiffs submitted the

affidavit of David Elwess, a title searcher for Plaintiffs, which stated that "it appears that
[the Alleged Roadway] was specifically omitted from the legal description of property
subject to tax or assessment by Washington County." (R. 171-72 (Aff. of David Elwess
119)).

4814-2584-0129

9

5.

The Elwess affidavit further stated that "[i]n about 1972 or 1973, [Dixie]

started deeding out separate parcels from the overall parent parcel." (R. 167 (Aff. of
David Elwess f 5)).
6.

In Plaintiffs' initial memorandum filed in support of their Cross-Motion for

partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs stated that "[o]n May 30, 1974, [Dixie] deeded a
four foot easement to the City of St. George which was added to an existing 46 foot rightof-way easement the City held, making a total 50 foot easement. The May 30, 1974
warranty deed specifically refers to the [Alleged Roadway] and states that: '[t]he
following described property to be added to and be part of an existing roadway to be used
by the grantee as and for a public roadway and easement for utilities.'" (R. 149
(Statement of Facts at Tf 18 (a))).
7.

In Plaintiffs' memorandum in support of their Cross-Motion for partial

summary judgment, Plaintiffs stated that "the [Alleged Roadway] connects between 1100
West and 1230 North, and has been in existence since about 1972 as [Dixie] deeded out
lots of the larger arena parcel." (R. 160 (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 22)).
8.

By contrast, on behalf of Dixie, Charles Welch testified by affidavit that the

land of the Alleged Roadway was included in the legal description in the conveyance
deed to Dixie, and that Dixie has paid all taxes on the Alleged Roadway property.
(R. 139 (Aff. of Charles Welchffi[4-5.)
9.

Arthur L. Partridge, the Washington County Assessor, in an April 15, 2004

letter to Dixie, wrote that "[a]fter a recent survey of two properties owned by Dixie
Riding Club, Inc., it was brought to the attention of the Washington County Assessor's
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office and the Washington County Recorders offices, that the acreage had been
understated for many years." Mr. Partridge also wrote that the understatement of acreage
had been corrected and that Dixie has never been delinquent in its payment of property
taxes. (R. 142 (Exhibit 1 to Aff. of Charles Welch)).
10.

Charles Welch testified by affidavit that Dixie had had discussions with the

City of St. George about making the Alleged Roadway a dedicated road, and that neither
the City of St. George nor Dixie decided to make the Alleged Roadway a dedicated road.
(R. 139 (Aff. of Charles Welchffij6-7)).
c. Facts Relating to the Use of the Alleged Roadway.
i. Evidence of Use Only by Neighboring Landowners
11.

In support of their Cross-Motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs

filed six affidavits discussing claimed use of the Alleged Roadway purportedly by
members of the general public. (R. 231-250, 271-285 (Affs. of Conrad Bowler, Ethan
Bundy, H. Val Hafen, Gilbert Jennings, Mansfield Jennings, and Lewis Bowler)).
12.

Five of those six affiants (Conrad Bowler, H. Val Hafen, Gilbert Jennings,

Mansfield Jennings, and Lewis Bowler), however, are named Plaintiffs in this action and
whom the evidence showed owned real property immediately abutting the Alleged
Roadway. (R. 231-236, 243-250, 271-285 (Affs. of Conrad Bowler, H. Val Hafen,
Gilbert Jennings, Mansfield Jennings, and Lewis Bowler); see also R. 139 (Aff. of
Charles Welch 13)).
13.

The sixth of those affiants (Ethan Bundy) is not a party to this case, but was

an owner of property abutting the Alleged Roadway until August 2000, including during
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the time Plaintiffs claim the Alleged Roadway was created. (R. 239 (Aff. of Ethan
Bundy1f2)).
14.

All six of those affidavits primarily discussed use of the Alleged Roadway

merely by neighboring landowners, including the affiants themselves, rather than by
members of the general public, including:
(a.)

Plaintiff Conrad Bowler's affidavit discussed claimed use by

property owners in the Ence Bowler Marsh Subdivision, which he developed,
located immediately to the west of the Alleged Roadway, to ride their horses from
one part of the neighborhood to another part of the neighborhood, and sometimes
to head toward Snow Canyon. (R. 232 (Aff. of Conrad Bowlerffij2 & 5));
(b.)

Other affiants also discussed use of the Alleged Roadway merely to

get from one part of the adjacent neighborhood to another. (R. 233 (Aff. of
Conrad Bowler ^ 6)); R. 240 (Aff. of Ethan Bundy % 5); R. 244 (Aff. of H. Val
Hafenffi[4 & 5); R. 273-74 (Aff. of Gilbert Jenningsffif5 & 9); R. 279 (Aff. of
Mansfield Jenningsffif5 & 8).
15.

The evidence presented by Dixie, however, was that Dixie allowed adjacent

land owners to use the Alleged Roadway from time to time with Dixie's express or
implied permission. (Aff. of Charles Welch ^ 9)).
ii. Evidence of Use by Persons other than Neighboring Landowners
16.

The six affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs discussing use of the Alleged

Roadway set forth only the following relating to the claimed use of the Alleged Roadway
purportedly or possibly by persons other than neighboring landowners:
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(a.)

On the north end of the Alleged Roadway was a trail head where

"many people" used to ride out in the country. (R. 233 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler
If 5)); R. 239 (Aff. of Ethan Bundy H 4); R. 272 (Aff. of Gilbert Jennings ] 4);
R. 278 (Aff. of Mansfield Jennings U 4).
(b.)

Instead of riding their horses on the nearby paved 1100 West road,

"people" used the Alleged Roadway to ride to the north and around an old turkey
farm that was about a mile away. (R. 233 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler ^ 5)); R. 239
(Aff. of Ethan Bundy ^ 4); R. 273 (Aff. of Gilbert Jennings 1J 4); R. 279 (Aff. of
Mansfield Jennings f 4)..
(c.)

The Alleged Roadway was traveled by the "public in general" from

about 1972 until 2002, approximately when the gate was put up by Dixie. (R. 233
(Aff. of Conrad Bowler ^ 6)); R. 240 (Aff. of Ethan Bundy f 5) (until 2000);
R. 244-45 (Aff. of H. Val Hafenfflf4 & 5); R. 273 (Aff. of Gilbert Jennings f 5);
R. 279 (Aff. of Mansfield Jennings 1f 5).
(d.)

The "general public" drove on the Alleged Roadway to look at

horses stabled along the Alleged Roadway, to take horses to be bred or stabled, to
discuss business regarding their horses, and to buy horses and sell horses. (R. 23435 (Aff. of Conrad Bowlerffi[7 & 11); R. 240-41 (Aff. of Ethan Bundyffl[8
& 10); R. 245 (Aff. of H. Val Hafen 16); R. 274 (Aff. of Gilbert Jennings U 9);
(e.)

The "general public" used the Alleged Roadway to watch people use

the sheriffs arena on the Dixie Property. (R. 234 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler f 7)
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R. 240-41 (Aff. of Ethan Bundy 1[ 10); R. 245 (Aff. of H. Val Hafen ^ 6); R. 274
(Aff. of Gilbert Jennings ] 8);
(f.)

The "general public" used the Alleged Roadway "almost daily,"

even when no public event took place at the arena. (R. 234 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler

18);
(g.)

The "general public" accessed a tack and saddle shop just south of

the arena via the Alleged Roadway. (R. 235 Aff. of Conrad Bowler ^ 10); R. 241
(Aff. of Ethan Bundy ] 9); R. 245 (Aff. of H. Val Hafen ] 6);
(h.)

The Alleged Roadway was used "by the public as a thoroughfare."

R. 246 (Aff. of H. Val Hafen U 68).
17.

Charles Welch testified in his affidavit on behalf of Dixie that Dixie has

never allowed the general public to use the property as a thoroughfare, a roadway, a
right-of-way, or any other use except if by implied or express permission. (R. 140 (Aff.
ofCharles Welch H 10)).
18.

In its answers to Plaintiffs' requests for admissions (which Plaintiffs cited

purportedly in support of their Cross-Motion), Dixie also stated that "any and all access
to the property in question was, in fact, done with the implied or express permission of
the general leadership, or membership of the Dixie Riding Club, Inc." (R. 256 (Answer
to Plaintiffs First Request for Admission No. 14)).
19.

A photograph of the Alleged Roadway taken in January 2005 shows the

approach to the Alleged Roadway, which Plaintiffs claim is a part of the Alleged
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Roadway, is a narrow pathway through large overgrown bushes. (R. 143 (Exhibit 2 to
Aff. of Charles Welch)).
d. The District Court's Findings and Rulings.
20.

The District Court ruled that Dixie's legal counsel below did not properly

object to and dispute the facts as claimed by Plaintiffs because he did not separately state
and quote each fact claimed by Plaintiff and follow each quoted fact with a discussion of
the evidence disputing each such claimed fact. The District Court therefore ruled that all
claimed facts set forth by Plaintiffs were deemed as admitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(c)(3)(B). The District Court therefore ruled that the Alleged Roadway "was
'continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of [far more than] ten years,5 as
is required to establish dedication and abandonment to the use of the public pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104," (R. 310 (Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment)
(alteration in original). A copy of the Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment is
attached hereto as Addendum No. 1. Based on that ruling, the District Court entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and also a Decree of Dedication, both of which
were drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel, declaring a 50-foot wide swath of the Dixie Property
to be dedicated and abandoned as a public highway. (R. 319-37 (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law); R. 338-40 (Decree of Dedication). Copies of the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and of the Decree of Dedication are attached hereto as
Addenda 2 & 3, respectively.).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court erred in declaring a portion of the Dixie Property dedicated and
abandoned as a public highway on Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs failed their burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the
elements required for dedication of private property as a public highway, particularly on
summary judgment where there were disputed facts on required elements of Plaintiffs'
claim as to whether any claimed use shown to the court was use by the public and
whether it was by permission. The District Court also abused its discretion in declaring
Plaintiffs' claimed facts as admitted by Dixie where they were actually disputed by sworn
affidavit.
Even if Plaintiffs had met their burden of proof (which Dixie denies), and even if
there were not disputes of material fact precluding summary judgment for Plaintiffs in
any event (which there were), the District Court still erred in granting Plaintiffs' CrossMotion in this case because it failed to receive any evidence regarding, or to make any
analysis or evaluation of, the reasonable and necessary width and use of the Alleged
Roadway, which is required under the governing statute and dispositive case law.
Declaration of a public highway in any event also was in error because the
evidence presented by Plaintiffs themselves showed that the City of St. George either
owned or had an easement to the Alleged Roadway. The City of St. George is therefore a
necessary and indispensable party to this case that concerns the parties' respective rights
to that property which Plaintiffs themselves claim the City may own. Plaintiffs, however,
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failed to join the City as a party to this case so that it could assert and protect its rights in
and to that property.
The District Court improperly rushed to summary judgment on this case. Its
decision is erroneous and indeed contrary to established rules of law and procedure in
several different regards. This Court therefore should reverse the District Court, and
remand this case for further proceedings.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT
PLAINTIFFS MET THEIR BURDEN TO PROVE, BY UNDISPUTED,
COMPETENT, CLEAR, AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, ALL OF THE
ELEMENTS REQUIRED UNDER THE GOVERNING STATUTE TO
GIVE RISE TO A DEDICATION AND ABANDONMENT OF DIXIE'S
PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR A PUBLIC HIGHWAY
A. Plaintiffs Failed Their Burden of Proof.
Plaintiffs were required, but failed, to prove by clear and convincing evidence all

elements required for the existence of a public highway. The ultimate determination of
whether the facts meet the statutory definition of a public highway "is a mixed question
of fact and law," which the appellate court reviews "for correctness." Heber City Corp. v.
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997).
In order to establish dedication for public use, the person seeking dedication must
demonstrate each of the following: (1) continuous use, (2) as a public thoroughfare, and
(3) for a period often years. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (emphasis added). The "public
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thoroughfare" element consists of and requires proof of all the following: (i) passing or
travel, (ii) by the public, (iii) without permission. Heber City, 942 P.2d at 311 (stating
above elements, including that "use by permission does not constitute use as a public
thoroughfare") (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916) (emphasis
added). Plaintiffs' public highway claim fails, and the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment for Plaintiffs, because Plaintiffs did not prove use by the public and
without permission.
The Utah Supreme Court has admonished that "the dedication of one's property to
a public use should not be regarded lightly." Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 648
(Utah 1966). Accordingly, that Court has held repeatedly that "[t]he presumption is in
favor of the property owner" and against a dedication, id., and all of the above-referenced
required elements for dedication of private property as a public highway must therefore
be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
The ultimate question in public dedication cases like this one is:
Was there sufficient evidence by competent testimony, by witnesses
who were not self-serving, to show by clear and convincing evidence,
that the public generally, — not just a few having their own special and
private interests in the road, had used the road continuously for 10
years? [Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545, 546-47
(Utah 1968) (emphasis added)].
The District Court's dedication of the Alleged Roadway to the public in this case,
based solely on Plaintiffs' handful of self-serving affidavits by neighboring property
owners including some of the Plaintiffs themselves, reveals a misapprehension of the
sanctity and respect which should be afforded to the ownership of property in Utah.
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For at least ninety years, Utah courts addressing the issue of public dedication by
use have consistently distinguished between use of a road by the general public, and use
by owners of adjoining property. "Such [adjoining] property owners cannot be
considered members of the public generally, as that term generally is used in dedication
by user statutes." Petersen, 438 P.2d at 546. Plaintiffs' affidavits submitted in this case,
however, establish at most only that neighboring landowners and their guests may have
used the Alleged Roadway to get from one part of the neighborhood to the next, to visit
one of the businesses located on property adjacent to the Alleged Roadway, or to observe
others using the equestrian arena on the Dixie Property.1 Such private uses of Dixie's
land, however, are insufficient as a matter of law to establish, and do not establish,
dedication to the public under Utah Code § 72-5-104. See e.g., Pitts v. Roberts, 562 P.2d
231, 232 (Utah 1971) (holding evidence insufficient to establish public use element under
public highway statute where only evidence presented was use by abutting land owners);
Thompson v. Nelson, 273 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1954) (emphasis that "use must be by the
public" in order to meet the public highway statute) (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 161
P. 1127, 1131(Utah 1916); See also Renfro v. McCowan, 2006 WL 3254509 at *4

1

See e.g., R. 232-35 (Affidavit of Conrad Bowler) ("Property owners who owned horses
west and south of the arena frequently rode their horses through the [Alleged Roadway],"
"The people having horses in the [adjacent] Ence Bowler Marsh Subdivision also road
(sic) their horses north through the [Alleged Roadway], and headed towards Snow
Canyon," "In addition, people frequently walked through the [Alleged Roadway] or
drove cars to get from one part of the neighborhood to the next," "numerous people used
both 1100 West and the [Alleged Roadway] to get to the [neighboring] Ence feed mill.").
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(D. Utah 2006) (noting that under Utah's public highway statute "the 'public' includes
those normally recognized as being the public, with the exception of owners of adjoining
property and those using the road by permission."). Thus, section 72-5-104's "use as a
public thoroughfare" requirement cannot be satisfied by any amount of use by the owners
of adjoining property.
Nor does any amount of use, even if it is by the public, give rise to a public
thoroughfare if such use is by permission. See e.g., Heber City, 942 P.2d at 311. "[U]se
by permission does not constitute use as a public thoroughfare." Id. (quotation omitted).
These well-established rules of law requiring use by the public generally and not
by permission in order to establish a public thoroughfare precluded summary judgment in
this case for at least three reasons. First, it is undisputed that all of Plaintiffs' affiants
were direct or indirect current or former owners of property abutting the Alleged
Roadway. Thus, any use by them as a matter of law is not use by the general public and
therefore cannot give rise to a public thoroughfare. Second, both in the affidavits it
submitted in opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion, and in its responses to Plaintiffs'
discovery requests (which were cited by Plaintiffs), Dixie stated that any and all access to
the Alleged Roadway was in fact with and by Dixie's express or implied permission.
Such permissive use as a matter of law cannot give rise to a public thoroughfare. Third,
in light of Dixie's affidavits and cited discovery responses there were in this case, and
are, issues and disputes of material fact as to whether people using the Alleged Roadway
were members of the general public whose use could ripen into a public highway or
whether they were merely neighboring landowners whose use could not ripen into any

4814-2584-0129

20

public highway, and as to whether use of the Alleged Roadway by anybody was
permissive and therefore not supportive at all of any public highway. Where there is any
dispute of material fact, summary judgment may not be granted. See Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c).
The landmark case of Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah
1968) is highly instructive to this one. In Petersen, the plaintiffs seeking to prove
dedication of a roadway as a public thoroughfare called numerous witnesses at trial, most
of whom were either property owners abutting or straddling the road in question. Many
of these witnesses were direct or indirect successors in title from a homesteader who had
settled the area. Based on these facts, the court concluded that these witnesses
were not a part of the general public, but were interested persons entitled
individually to use the road personally in virtue of their documentary title,
and they or their personal visitors cannot be numbered in the class of
members of the general public using such road in a fashion that might
ripen into a dedication of a road under the statute." Petersen, 20 Utah 2d
at 379,438 P.2d at 547.
Likewise, in the case at bar Plaintiffs failed to prove use by the public generally.
Plaintiffs provided six affidavits regarding claimed use of the Alleged Roadway. None of
those affiants, however, were disinterested members of the general public. Each of them
admitted that they own, had recently owned, or were members of a limited liability
company (Plaintiff Jennings Investment, LC) which owns, property adjacent to the
Alleged Roadway. Each of them also discussed use primarily by neighboring property
owners as discussed more fully above. The only evidence Plaintiffs presented of use of
the Alleged Roadway by persons other than neighboring landowners is a set of self-
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serving and impermissibly conclusory statements, without foundation, by Plaintiffs'
affiants to the effect that the "general public" used the Alleged Roadway. Not one
member of the "general public" is identified. Nor do Plaintiffs indicate how many
members of the "general public" used the Alleged Roadway, or how often. Not one
member of the "general public" provided an affidavit describing his or her use of the
Alleged Roadway. In short, there is nothing in Plaintiffs' affidavits that establishes at
all, and certainly not by the required quantum of "clear and convincing evidence," that
the persons who purportedly used the Alleged Roadway were not other neighboring
landowners or otherwise were not using the Alleged Roadway with Dixie's permission.
Since no disinterested party provided testimony regarding use of the road by the general
public, and the evidence provided by Plaintiffs' affiants to the effect that the "general
public" used the Alleged Roadway is, at best, vague, conclusory and without foundation,
the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' affidavits simply do not and cannot constitute the required
"clear and convincing evidence" of use "as a public thoroughfare." See Petersen, 438
P.2d at 547 ("we believe the testimony of plaintiffs' own witnesses defeated the
plaintiffs' cause on the simple principle that the testimony of one's own witnesses is no
stronger than its weakest link"). It therefore was plain error for the District Court in this
case to hold that the use alleged by Plaintiffs established use by the general public "as a

2

Indeed, Plaintiffs' affidavits are inadmissibly vague, conclusory, and without
foundation, and therefore should not have been relied upon at all in the summary
judgment proceedings. See e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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public thoroughfare" by clear and convincing evidence, particularly on summary
judgment in light of the disputes of material facts.
B. Even if Plaintiffs Had Met Their Prima Facie Burden of Proof,
Disputes of Fact Precluded Summary Judgment for Plaintiffs
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment for Plaintiffs where there
were disputes of material fact. Summary judgment can be granted only if "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P.; Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah
1982) ("a motion for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving party would
entitle him to judgment as a matter of law.").
It is well-settled that "'[o]ne sworn statement under oath [involving a material
fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary
judgment.'" Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) (alteration in
original). In proceedings on a motion for summary judgment, all facts and inferences
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. E.g., Drysdale v.
3

The District Court misstated Dixie's standing argument as whether private citizens
may ever bring suit under Utah Code § 72-5-104. The standing issue articulated by Dixie
below actually pertains to whether the claimed evidence of use that was presented to the
District Court was use by the "public" sufficient under the statute, or use by private
parties and neighboring property owners that legally cannot create a public highway. As
shown above, the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs despite the
fact that the affidavits they filed in support of their Cross-Motion for summary judgment
were all made by current or former neighboring landowners, and which failed to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the Alleged Roadway was used "as a public
thoroughfare," was error.
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Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). Also, all facts asserted by Dixie in
opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for summary judgment were required to be taken
as established for the purposes of these proceedings. E.g., Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d
1332, 1334-35 (Utah 1977).
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals views "the facts
in a light most favorable to the losing party below." Johnson v. Utah Dept. of Trans.,
2004 UT 284 ^ 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (quotation omitted). "Because the question of
whether summary judgment is appropriate is a question of law," the Court of Appeals
"accord[s] no deference to the trial court." Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the District Court impermissibly granted summary judgment for Plaintiff
over and despite the presence of genuine disputes of material fact raised by Dixie. In
particular, the District Court determined that the claimed use being made of the Alleged
Roadway was not permissive, despite sworn testimony from Dixie that it was. The court
further declared that the claimed use was by members of the general public, where that
claim was also disputed.
Public highway dedication cases are inherently fact intensive, and not prone to
resolution on summary judgment, particularly in light of plaintiffs' burden to prove all
required elements by "clear and convincing evidence." Indeed, amid the seventeen
reported Utah appellate opinions that have reviewed a district court's grant of a claim for
dedication of a roadway to the public under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 and its
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predecessors, only one (Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995)) involved
such a dedication granted on summary judgment and without a trial.4
In the one reported Utah case that involved a public highway dedication granted
on summary judgment, the Utah Supreme Court reversed because there were issues of
disputed material facts. Id. at 1099. Specifically, it was disputed that users of the road in
question were members of the general public and using the road without permission:
The main thrust of the affidavits filed by defendants is that people using the
road as described in the court's findings of fact prior to about 1960 did so
with the permission of the landowners over whose property the road
coursed. For example, the people using the road during the 1920s and the
1930s to extract silica from a pit, to gather firewood, and to transport and
graze cattle and sheep were either owners of land adjacent to the road, their
employees, or people to whom permission had been given by the
landowners.
***

4

Those Utah appellate court opinions reviewing a district court's grant of a claim for
dedication of a public roadway after a trial are: Whittaker v. Ferguson, 51 P. 980 (Utah
1898); Schettler v. Lynch, 64 P. 955 (Utah 1901); Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v.
Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1929); Jeremy v. Bertagnole 116 P.2d 420 (Utah 1941);
Bonner v. Sudbury, All P.2d 646 (Utah 1966); Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah
1968); Blonquistv. Blonquist, 516 P.2d 343 (Utah 1973); Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d
447 (Utah 1981); Memmottv. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982); Butler, Crockett, and
Walsh Development Corps, v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah
1995); Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1996); Chapman v. Uintah County,
2003 UT App. 383, 81 P.3d 761; AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 112 P.3d 1228 (Utah App.
2005); Utah v. Six Mile Ranch, 2006 UT App. 104, 132 P.3d 687; Utah County v. Butler,
2006 UT App. 444,
P.3d
; Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473,
P.3d
. The United States District Court for the District of Utah recently held that a
road was "abandoned and dedicated to the use of the public" under Utah Code § 72-5-104
on summary judgment. Renfro v. McCowan, 2006 WL 3254509 (D. Utah 2006). That
case is clearly distinguishable from this one, however, since in Renfro the defendant
conceded that the general public used the road without permission, see id. at *5, whereas
use by the public and use by permission both are contested issues in this case.
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Thus, we find that there is a material issue of fact as to whether people
using the road prior to 1960 were members of the general public whose use
could ripen into a public way or whether they were landowners in the area
who had either a private right to use the road or permission of the owners
over whose land the road coursed. [Id. at 1099-1100 (emphasis added)].
In reversing the district court's grant of a public highway by summary judgment,
the Supreme Court noted that "[f]act-sensitive cases such as this case do not lend
themselves to a determination on summary judgment." A/, at 1101.
The same disputed issues of fact the Supreme Court identified in Bernardo as
precluding summary judgment also exist in the case at bar. The District Court's findings
and conclusions that use of the Alleged Roadway was not by permission are directly
contrary to the facts stated in the affidavit of Charles Welch and Dixie's responses to
Plaintiffs' discovery requests that were cited in the summary judgment proceedings.
Since "[o]ne sworn statement under oath [involving a material fact] is all that is necessary
to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary judgment," Nyman, 966 P.2d at
1213, and particularly since facts asserted by Dixie in opposition to Plaintiffs' summary
judgment motion were required to be taken as true, and all facts and inferences were
required to be viewed in the light most favorable to Dixie against Plaintiffs' motion,
Durham, 571 P.2d at 1334-35, Drysdale, 947 P.2d at 680, summary judgment in this case
was improper. There were and are disputes of the material facts as to whether the
claimed use of the Alleged Roadway was by the general public, and even if so, whether it
was by permission. Both of those material facts go to whether Plaintiffs established use
"as a public thoroughfare," a required element of their case, within the meaning of Utah
Code § 72-5-104. Since that required element was disputed factually, the District Court's
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grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs must be reversed and this case remanded for
trial.
C. The District Court Improperly Engaged In A Weighing Of Disputed
Facts and Evidence On Summary Judgment
As shown above, there were, and are, disputes of material facts on required
elements of Plaintiffs' claim. By ruling as it did that the Alleged Roadway was used by
the general public, without permission, as a public thoroughfare, the District Court
necessarily weighed the disputed and contradictory facts and evidence on those points.
Indeed, it acknowledged as much in its Ruling, drawing a contrast between the parties'
respective materials and noting that Plaintiffs' materials struck the court as "clearly more
detailed and analytical." (R. 309, Ruling n.l). It is well-established, however, that: "It is
inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a summary
judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). "It matters not that the evidence on one side may
appear to be strong or even compelling." Id. (citations omitted). "'One sworn statement
under oath [involving a material fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue,
thereby precluding summary judgment.'" Nyman, 966 P.2d at 1213. In light of the
disputed evidence before the District Court, and the District Court's impermissible
weighing of that evidence, summary judgment for Plaintiffs was improper and must be
reversed.
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D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Dedicating Dixie's
Property To The Public Because Of Dixie's Prior Counsel's Failure To
Strictly Comply With The Technical Requirements Of Rule 7 For
Statements Of Fact
The District Court decided to deem as admitted all of the claimed facts set forth by
Plaintiffs in support of Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion because they were not specifically
controverted by Dixie's prior counsel in numbered paragraphs that quoted verbatim the
claimed facts submitted by Plaintiffs and separately articulated disputing facts specific to
each paragraph. (R. 310 (Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment); R. 320 (Findings
of Fact HI)).
The Utah appellate courts have repeatedly grappled with balancing the need for
efficient judicial resolution of litigation and the rights of litigants who may not fully
comply with the format requirements of the rules of civil procedure.5 The District
Court's ruling in this case is a stark example of the elevation of form over substance, and
an abuse of the District Court's discretion.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that even where an "opposing
memorandum [does] not set forth disputed facts listed in numbered sentences in a
separate section as required by [Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration, as long as] the disputed facts [are] clearly provided in the body of the

Most of the Utah case law considering the issue of whether a district court has abused
its discretion by requiring strict compliance with the format requirements of motions was
decided under Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Effective
November 1, 2003, Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was
repealed, and its procedural content was moved to its present location in Rule 7(c)(3)(B)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Gary Porter Const v. Fox Const, Inc., 2004
UTApp 354,1[9,n.l, 101 P.3d371 (2004).
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memorandum with applicable record references,... failure to comply with the technical
requirements of rule 4-501(2)(B) is harmless." Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready
Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155, 160, n. 4 (Utah 2004); see also Gary Porter Const v. Fox Const,
Inc., 101 P.3d 371, 375-76 n. 2 (Utah App. 2004) (examining facts set forth in the body
of summary judgment memorandum despite noncompliance with rule 7(c)(3)).
Here, the two Affidavits of Charles Welch filed by Dixie clearly state facts which
dispute factual allegations set forth in Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion and affidavits. For
example, Charles Welch's sworn affidavits discuss and state both that the Plaintiffs'
affiants are or have been at all times relevant to this case owners of neighboring
property, which disputes the "public" use element of Plaintiffs' claims, and that any and
all use of the Alleged Roadway has been with Dixie's permission. (R. 138-44 & R. 29092).6 Mr. Welch's affidavits were referred to and discussed in the body of Dixie's
summary judgment memoranda. (E.g., R. 129-37 & R. 286-89).
When Mr. Welch's affidavit testimony is compared with the statements set forth in
Plaintiffs' affidavits, Dixie successfully stated facts which directly dispute a central
element of Plaintiffs' case - whether the use of the Alleged Roadway was "as a public
thoroughfare" within the meaning of Utah Code § 72-5-104, which as shown above
requires both use by the public without permission. Accordingly, under Salt Lake County
v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., Dixie's failure to comply with the technical format
requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) was harmless, and the District Court's decisions to deem

6

Due to an apparent error at the District Court, there are two pages in the record
numbered 140 (as well as 139, 141, 142, and 143).
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all facts set forth by Plaintiffs in support of their Cross-Motion as admitted by Dixie, was
an abuse of the District Court's discretion, particularly in light of the principle that "the
dedication of one's property to a public use should not be regarded lightly." Bonner v.
Sudbury, 417 P.2d 648 (Utah 1966). This decision should be reversed and this case
remanded for trial.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING TO
ASSESS THE REASONABLE AND NECESSARY WIDTH OF THE
ALLEGED ROADWAY.
Even if a public highway were properly found to exist, which Dixie denies, the

District Court erred in failing to assess its "reasonable and necessary" width of it. The
public dedication statute expressly states that the scope of public highway found to exist
is "that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel under the facts and
circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3). Since the Utah Supreme Court has held
that determination of the "necessary and reasonable width" of a dedicated road requires
"the full adjudication of the relevant facts . . . unearthed at trial," such a finding is simply
not amenable to summary judgment. Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1101, 1101
(1995); see also Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline,
909 P.2d 225,232 (Utah 1995) ("Determining what width is necessary and proper is a
question of fact... [which] involves a careful balancing of 'what is reasonable and
necessary' given the particular facts of a given case."). Particularly not in this case where
there was no evidence whatsoever presented by Plaintiffs to show in any way what the
reasonable and necessary width of any Alleged Roadway would be. The District Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law did not contain any findings as to the
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reasonable and necessary width of the Alleged Roadway dedicated to the public, nor
could it since there was no evidence presented by Plaintiffs on that material issue.
Plaintiffs merely unilaterally and subjectively wished to have a roadway fifty feet in
width, so they inserted that figure into the Decree of Dedication that was entered by the
Court, without any analysis or findings whatsoever regarding whether that was the
reasonable and necessary width. This is plain and reversible error.
In Kohler v. Martin, this Court held that "even if a public thoroughfare was
created, the trial court erred in failing to assess the reasonable and necessary width of the
roadway." 916 P.2d 910, 914 (1996) (emphasis added). The trial court had held that the
public thoroughfare extended to a certain noted width, without making a determination of
what was "reasonable and necessary under all the facts and circumstances." Id. {quoting
Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982)). Because the trial court had failed
to make this determination, this Court remanded the case for the purpose of determining
the appropriate width of the declared roadway.
Likewise, in the case at issue here, "a careful review of the record herein contains
no evidence concerning the reasonable and necessary width of the [Alleged Roadway.]"
Memmott, 642 P.2d at 754. Accordingly, there was no basis for the District Court's
dedication of a roadway to the public that is fifty feet wide. That ruling therefore was
plain error and must be reversed and remanded.
In determining the appropriate width of a dedicated road, the trial court must take
into consideration the uses to which the road historically has been put, and set the width
"according to what was reasonable and necessary, under all the facts and circumstances,
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for the uses which were made of the road." Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos,
285 P. 646, 649 (Utah 1929). Here, the primary use of the Alleged Roadway was by
people walking and riding horses across the Dixie Property.7 Indeed, photographs
presented to the District Court showed the Alleged Roadway overgrown by vegetation,
and far more narrow than fifty feet. The fifty-foot wide roadway dedicated to the public
by virtue of the District Court's Decree of Dedication is therefore far wider than is
"reasonable or necessary" for the historical use of the Alleged Roadway. Indeed, fifty
feet was a width unilaterally and subjectively chosen by Plaintiffs, likely because that is
the width required by St. George City Code for development, an obvious and
impermissible expansion of the scope of any Alleged Roadway and the historic use even
as claimed by Plaintiffs.
The District Court must be reversed, and this matter must be remanded to the
District Court for discovery and a trial, including on the issue of the reasonable and
necessary width of any Alleged Roadway in light of, and to be limited by, the historical
use of the Alleged Roadway.

7

See R. 232-33 (Affidavit of Conrad Bowler) (describing use by riders on horseback and
walkers); R. 239-40 (Affidavit of Ethan Bundy) (same); R. 244-45 (Affidavit of H. Val
Hafen) (same); R. 272-73 (Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings) (same); R. 278-79; (Affidavit of
Mansfield Jennings) (same); R. 283-84 (Affidavit of Lewis J. Bowler) (same).
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III.

IF THE CITY OF ST. GEORGE OWNS OR HAS EASEMENT RIGHTS TO
THE ALLEGED ROADWAY, AS PLAINTIFFS' OWN EVIDENCE
INDICATES, PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED FOR FAILURE TO
NAME THE CITY OF ST. GEORGE AS A NECESSARY AND
INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
A person or entity who claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the

action whose interests may be affected by the outcome of the case "shall" be joined as
parties to the action. Utah R. Civ. P. 19 (emphasis added). Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law to abandon property rights and interests Plaintiffs claim were owned by St. George,
but without naming St. George as a party, should be reviewed for correctness and
afforded no deference. Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95 ^ 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991.
The basic purpose of Rule 19 is '"to protect the interests of absent persons as well
as those already before the court from multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial
determinations.'" Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990). When
faced with a Rule 19 determination, a court must first decide whether a party is
"necessary" under Rule 19(a). Id; Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah
App.1989).
A party is "necessary" if
he [or she] claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his [or her] absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his [or her] ability to protect that interest
or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of his [or her] claimed interest. [Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)].
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Plaintiffs' own evidence shows that the city of St. George is a "necessary" party.
To begin with, it is undisputed that the Alleged Roadway is located within the city limits
of the City of St. George. Plaintiffs then presented evidence through the affidavit of title
searcher David Elwess that the City has had an easement to a 46-foot wide portion of the
Alleged Roadway since at least 1974, and that Dixie had granted an additional four-foot
easement to the City which was added to that allegedly pre-existing 46-foot wide strip.
Plaintiffs also presented evidence through the Elwess affidavit to the effect that the
Alleged Roadway property was not on the tax rolls of Washington County, presumably to
o

show the Alleged Roadway was already owned by the City as a public road. If any of
that evidence is correct (which Dixie does not admit), then the City's interest in the
property that is the subject of this case makes the City a necessary party to this case,
because the resolution of this litigation in favor of either Plaintiffs or in favor of Dixie is
likely to impair or impede the City's ability to protect its alleged interests. That also
could leave Plaintiffs and Dixie subject to a risk of incurring inconsistent obligations by
reason of the City's claimed interests.
"[U]nder the language of [Rule 19(a)], if the [absent] party is necessary and
joinder is feasible, then joinder is mandatory." Landes, 795 P.2d at 1131. Joinder of the
City of St. George as a party to this case therefore is mandatory.
8

Dixie disputed those claimed facts, submitting the Affidavit of Charles Welch stating
the Alleged Roadway property was included in the deed to Dixie, that Dixie had at all
times continued to own and pay the taxes on that property, and that the City had
previously refused to dedicate that property as a public road. (R, 139). This additional
dispute of facts further precluded summary judgment for Plaintiffs in addition to the
disputes of fact discussed above. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The District Court therefore
should be reversed for this additional reason.
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Plaintiffs' claim fails, and the District Court erred, for not joining St. George as a
necessary and indispensable party to this case. A district court's failure to follow the twostep analysis under Rule 19 constitutes reversible error. Seftel, 767 P.2d at 945; see also
Landes, 795 P.2d at 1130 (court erred by failing to discuss specific facts and reasoning
leading to conclusion whether that party is necessary or indispensable under Rule 19).
The District Court never conducted the analysis required by Rule 19 and binding caselaw
construing it. Accordingly, the Court's dedication of the Alleged Roadway to the public
should be reversed, and this case should be remanded for joinder of St. George as a
necessary and indispensable party, and for discovery and trial.
CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District Court should be
reversed and this case should be remanded for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^AayofJanuary, 2007.

^RoberJJ. Dale
Bradley L. Tilt!
Matthew B. Hutchinson
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, PC
Attorneys for Defendant /Appellant
Dixie Riding Club, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT DIXIE RIDING CLUB, INC. were mailed by first-class mail with
postage fully prepaid this

ay of January, 2007, to:
V. Lowry Snow
Lewis P. Reece
SNOW JENSEN & REECE
134 North 200 East, Suite 302
St. George, Utah 84771
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FILED
JAN 112006
fFTH DISTRICT COURT
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COtfRT^fc H , N G T O N C 0 U N T Y
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
v

JENNINGS INVESTMENT, LC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

RULINGS ON MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 030500781
Judge G. Rand Beacham

DIXIE RIDING CLUB, INC., et al„
Defendants.
This matter came before me pursuant to Defendant's "Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment" and Plaintiffs' "Cross Motion for Summary Judgment." Each party filed the necessary
supporting and opposing memoranda, affidavits and other materials. Having studied the memoranda
and other documents, having heard the arguments of counsel at a hearing, and having reviewed the
file for this action, I have determined to deny Defendant's Motion and to grant Plaintiffs' Motion.
I will not undertake extensive analysis,1 however, and will only make a few observations:
1.

Defendant's supporting memorandum does not meet the formal or substantive

requirements of Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment.
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would be denied for this reason alone, because
Defendant cannot meet its burden of proof without substantially complying with these rules.
2.

Plaintiffs' supporting memorandum and materials are thorough and comprehensive,

'The brevity of this Ruling is not indicative of the time I have spent in the review of these Motions. It has
been my experience and that of other judges of the trial bench, however, that the parties are primarily interested in
the outcome and that the appellate courts seldom acknowledge the opinions and reasoning of the trial courts. In
addition, the Utah appellate courts have consistently reversed far more summary judgment decisions than they have
affirmed. Finally, Plaintiffs' memoranda and materials are clearly more detailed and analytical than Defendant's
memoranda and materials, so that few serious issues are adequately framed for discussion. Consequently, the time
required to prepare a comprehensive memorandum decision does not seem to be warranted.

and they substantially comply with the requirements of Rules 7 and 56. Plaintiffs have established
their factual statements by competent evidence, so that Defendant was required to respond as
provided in Rule 7(c)(3)(B). Defendant did not do so, however; Plaintiff is correct in noting that
it is not the court's burden "to ferret out Defendant's attempts to controvert Plaintiffs' facts by a
careful winnowing of Defendant's evidence." See "Reply in re: Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment," p. 4. Consequently, each fact set forth in Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts "is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment." See Rule 7(c)(3)(A).
3.

Plaintiffs' memoranda also clearly analyze the relevant precedents of the Utah

appellate courts and their application to the issues of this case. Defendant's arguments are also clear,
but in my judgment, are not correct as to the facts which are without controversy in this case.
4.

The facts before me for purposes of summary judgment clearly demonstrate that the

disputed property was "continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of [far more than]
ten years," as is required to establish dedication and abandonment to the use of the public pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104.
5.

Defendant has provided no authority for its argument that Plaintiffs lack standing to

maintain this action. The Utah precedents cited by both parties demonstrate that an action under
Section 72-5-104 can be maintained by private citizens.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is hereby denied and Plaintiffs' Motion is hereby granted.
Plaintiffs' counsel should submit an appropriate judgment.
Dated this \C> day of January, 2006.

G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE
2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this j,/-» day ol\J(Ju/1^2006,1 provided true and correct copies
of the foregoing RULING to each of the attorneys named below by placing a copy in such attorney's
file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah:
V. Lowry Snow and
Lewis P. Reece
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Alan D. Boyack and
Matthew Bishop
Attorneys for Defendant

OF COURT
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ADDENDUM NO. 2

SNOW JENSEN & REECE
V. Lowry Snow [3030]
Lewis P. Reece [5785]
Counsel for Plaintiffs
134 North 200 East, Suite 302
St. George, Utah 84771-2747
Telephone: (435) 628-3688
Telecopier: (435) 628-3275

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JENNINGS INVESTMENT, LC, GILBERT
JENNINGS, MANSFIELD JENNINGS,
CONRAD BOWLER, LEWIS J. AND
DORCUS N. BOWLER, H. VAL HAFEN,
RANDY AND GAI BOWLER, TROY AND
KERRIE BOWLER, JOHN BOWLER,
Plaintiffs,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 030500781
Judge: G. Rand Beacham

DLXIE RIDING CLUB, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH
20,
Defendants.

Defendant having filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs havingfileda
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, and following oral argument on both motions on
November 10, 2005, and the Court having previously entered its Ruling on Motions for
Summary Judgment on January 12,2006, the Court now makes and enters its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court has studied in depth the parties' respective memoranda and affidavits.

Defendant has not properly objected to the facts as alleged by Plaintiff, by "specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact" as Defendant is required to do under the
rules. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Defendant cannot simply rely on its pleadings but has an
affirmative duty to controvert Plaintiffs' alleged facts. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health
Center. Inc.. 2003 UT 23 If 50, 70 P.3d 904; Rawson v. Conover. 2001 UT 24% 25, 20 P.3d 876;
R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068, 1078 (Utah 1997); Jones v.
Hinkle. 611 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1980). Moreover, Defendant failed to separately state each fact
in support of its motion, numbering those facts and supporting them by citation to relevant
materials such as affidavits or discovery materials, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A and
B). The facts alleged by Plaintiffs are therefore deemed admitted. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(A).
Moreover, because Plaintiffs' facts are properly supported as required by Utah R. Civ. P.
7(c)(3)(A) and 56(e), and are not properly contested by Defendant, the Court finds the following
material facts by clear and convincing evidence, there being no competent evidence against
Plaintiffs' alleged facts and the same being deemed admitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(A).
2.

The property that is the subject matter of this dispute was originally owned by the

Washington County Sheriffs Posse and established as a race track and stables for horses roughly
50 years ago. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, % 2. As shown on Exhibit E of Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Support, which is a copy of Defendant's Answers to Discovery, and Exhibit A
thereto, which is a copy of the owners' dedication plat, (hereinafter "the Owners' Dedication
Plat"), the road that is the subject of this dispute surrounds the race track and arena, and is
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located in Washington County, State of Utah and is more particularly legally described in the
Owners' Dedication Plat as follows:
Beginning at a point North 0°36'20" West 515.18 feet along the Section
Line from the Southeast Corner of Section 14, Township 42 South,
Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South
89°33' West 425.44 feet to a point of curvature of a 20.00 foot radius
curve to the left; thence along the arc of said curve 31.47 feet to a point
on 1100 West Street; thence along said city street North 0°36'20" West
90.24 feet to a point on a 20.245 foot radius curve to the left (center
bears North 89°23'40" East); thence Southeasterly along the arc of said
curve 31.75 feet to a point of a tangency; thence North 89°33' East
345.22 feet to a point of curvature of a 30.00 foot radius curve to the
left; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve 47.205 feet to a
point of tangency; thence North 0°36'20" West 1148.73 feet to a point of
curvature of a 20.245 foot radius curve to the left; thence North westerly
along the arc of said curve 31.75 feet to a point on a county road; thence
along said county road North 89°33' East 24.19 feet to the point of a
209.40 foot radius curve to the right (center bears S 0°27'00" E); thence
Southeasterly along the arc of said curve 78.39 feet to a point on a
22.316 foot radius curve to the left (center bears S 2 1 W W); thence
along the arc of said curve 43.47 feet to a point of tangency, said point
being on the Section Line; thence along said Section Line South
0°36'20" East 1213.67 feet to the point of beginning Containing 1.901
Acres.
For convenience hereinafter, the road more particularly described above shall be referred to as
the "1020 West X 1050 North Street" or "the subject road" or "the subject roadway."
3.

Plaintiffs Jennings Investment, LC, H. Val Hafen, Lewis and Dorcus Bowler,

Randy and Gale Bowler, Troy and Carry Bowler, and John Bowler own property that abuts the
subject roadway. Plaintiffs Gilbert Jennings, Mansfield Jennings and Conrad Bowler, however,
do not own property that abuts the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. See Affidavit of Gilbert
Jennings, 1f 2; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 2; and Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 3.
Indeed, Conrad Bowler was one of the original members of the Sheriffs Posse who got together
and purchased the subject property in approximately 1955. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 2.
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4.

From the time the Sheriffs Posse built the arena until shortly after Washington

County built the arena neighboring the Purgatory Correctional Facility, the posse arena was the
location of numerous rodeos for children and high school rodeos, horse racing and barrel racing,
amateur rodeos including rodeos on New Year's Day, and other similar events to which the
general public was invited. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 4; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, % 3;
Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, f 3; and Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 3.
5.

Notwithstanding, after these public events, Defendant's permission to use the

1020 West X 1050 North Street was withdrawn. "The Defendants [sic] concede that members of
the public have been invited to attend different rodeo type advents [sic], such as calf roping, etc.,
to which their permission ceased after the event was concluded." Defendant's Memorandum in
Support, page 4 (emphasis added). See also Affidavit of Charles Welch, ^ft[ 8, 9 and 10. Indeed,
sometime roughly between 1985 and 1990, Defendant began constructing a gate across 1020
West X 1050 North Street to prevent the general public's access through the road, but following
some dispute, the gate was never completed and public access remained unimpeded. Affidavit of
Val Hafen, f 6. The public rodeo events to which the general public was invited occurred
approximately between four to six times a year. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 4.
6.

Much of the property in the Bowler, Ence and Marsh subdivision which was west

of the Posse arena was used by the owners as horse property. This was the primary purpose of
the Bowler Ence Subdivision. Affidavit of Conrad Bower, f 2. The Bowler Ence Subdivision
along with the Posse property "was horse country. Numerous people stabled horses, sold horses,
bred horses, and people drove vehicles, rode horses and walked on the subject road to do their
business." Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, ^ 7.
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7.

Although Defendant's implied permission to use 1020 West X 1050 North Street

was withdrawn, Property owners who owned horses west of the arena frequently rode their
horses through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street because that road was not paved and was
easier on their horses' hooves and safer for the riders. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 5. The
1020 West X 1050 North Street was frequently used by horse owners to ride their horses from
one part of the neighborhood to another part of the neighborhood. On the north end of the 1020
West X 1050 North Street was a trail head. Horse riders would gofromthe Bowler Ence
Subdivision through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street and ride up in the north country,
sometimes to the area now known as Winchester Hills or to Snow Canyon. Affidavit of Conrad
Bowler, f 5; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, % 4; Affidavit of Val Hafen, f 4 Affidavit of Gilbert
Jennings, f 4; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 4; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 4. A road went
on up to the old turkey farm north of the Posse arena and was straight up the 1100 West Street.
See Owners' Dedication Plat. Instead of riding up 1100 West, people often rode their horses up
the 1020 West X 1050 North Street to get to the old turkey farm. The subject road was open, and
access was open and unimpeded. The subject road did not dead end in any fashion and was
continually used by the general public to ride their horses as described abovefromabout 1972
until 2002. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 5; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, If 4; Affidavit of Gilbert
Jennings, f 4; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 4; and Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, % 4.
8*

In addition, people frequently walked through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street

or drove cars though it to get from one part of the neighborhood to the next. This occurred
almost on a daily basis. Numerous people stabled their horses, sold horses and bred horses in the
area, and the general public drove vehicles, rode horses, and walked on and through the 1020
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West X 1050 North Street to do their business and to cross from 1100 West Street in St. George
to get to the 1230 North Street. The Ence brothers had a feed store and mill just west of 1100
West Street for about ten years, and many people used the subject road to get to the feed mill
from the 1230 North Street. Further, just south of the arena, for three or four years in the 1980s,
a tack and saddle shop operated selling saddles and tack to the general public. The general
public gained access to this tack shop by traveling through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street.
The subject road was well traveled and continuously traveled by the public in general from about
1972 until roughly 2002. No gates limited access to the subject road or through the subject road
in any fashion. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, Iff 7, 10, 11; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, ff 5, 8, 11;
Affidavit of Val Hafen, f 5; Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, % 6; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f
5; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 5.
9.

Moreover, peoplefrequentlypracticed rodeo events at the arena or simply in

general practiced to improve their roping, barrel racing, etc., and these practices were not public
events. Notwithstanding, often times the general public came to watch these practices. Affidavit
of Conrad Bowler, f 9; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, % 7; Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, % 8;
Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, ^f 7.
10.

There were never any restrictions for use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street

until about three years ago. The general public drove through it to get from one end of the
neighborhood to the next, rode horses on it to get from one part of the neighborhood to the other,
drove on it to watchfriendspractice rodeo events, drove on it to take horses to be bred or
stabled, drove on it to buy horses and sell horses, and drove on it to buy or fix saddles and tack.
This occurred continuously and almost on a daily basisfromabout 1972 until approximately two
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years ago when the Defendant put up gates across the subject road. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler,
K 8; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, f 10; Affidavit of Val Hafen, % 6; Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, f
9; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, % 8; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 6.
11.

Notwithstanding this access by the general public, Defendant and its predecessors

in title did not give any specific permission to use the subject road. Rather permission was
implied to use the road but only during scheduled public events. Affidavit of Charles Welch, Hf
8, 9 and 10; Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, If 8; Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, % 6.
12.

During the last 30 years, from about 1972 until roughly 2002, the 1020 West X

1050 North Street was graveled and graded occasionally by both St. George City and
Washington County. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, % 12; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, ^f 6; Affidavit
of Gilbert Jennings, % 7; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 6.
13.

Moreover, from 1982 until 2002, the subject road was specifically omitted by

legal description from the tax rolls of property that was assessed for property tax in Washington
County. Affidavit of David Elweese, ^flf 19 and 20.
14.

The photograph identified in the Affidavit of Charles Welch filed in support of

Defendant's motion is misleading. As stated in that affidavit, the photograph was recently taken.
Affidavit of Charles Welch, 1f 11. Because of the gate across the 1020 West X 1050 North Street
the dispute between the parties, the City of St. George has discontinued grading the subject road,
and the subject road has fallen into disrepair. Indeed, Charles Welch dug the trench where the
weeds are growing and then placed telephone poles as shown in the photograph, along the side
so people could not go around the poles and drive on the subject road. Affidavit of Conrad
Bowler, f 13; Affidavit of Val Hafen, % 7; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 7. Defendant has
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harassed those who attempt to use the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. Affidavit of Val Hafen, f
10; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 9.
15.

Defendant itself admits that the public has had open and free access on the subject

road and that only when Plaintiff Jennings Investment built the shopping center complex was
access restricted. In relevant part, Defendant states in response to Plaintiffs' discovery requests
as follows:

Admission No. 14. Please admit that the general public would
watch both Dixie Riding Club members or Posse members and non
members alike as they practiced calf roping, bull dogging, barrel
racing and other rodeo related events, in preparation for public
events to be held both at the Dixie Riding Club arena and
elsewhere, or as they practice just for fun, and that the general
public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Road in doing so, and
that this took place for a continuous period in excess often years
sometime between 1967 and the present.
Answer to Admission No. 14. As it hereto has been articulated in
other admissions, any and all access to the property in question
was, in fact, done with the implied or express permission of the
general leadership, or membership of the Dixie Riding Club, Inc.
There has never been a time since 1967 up until approximately two
(2) years ago, there was any necessity of blocking any traffic of
any persons not specifically members of the Dixie Riding Club,
Inc., because open and free access existed to the south, to the west
and to the north. Only when the Plaintiffs, Jennings built a
shopping center complex, did the restriction of access to the areas,
having heretofore been articulated, was [sic] cut off by the
fabrication of the shopping center complex. Therefore, Admission
No. 14 is not admitted.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support, Exhibit E, page 6 (emphasis added).
16.

In addition, Defendant attempted to dedicate this road formally to the City of St.

George in May, 1987. See Owners' Dedication Plat. This plat has never been recorded, but
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again evidences the "open and free access" Defendant referred to in responding to Request for
Admission No. 14.
17.

Moreover, numerous deeds and documents recorded with the Washington County

Recorder signed by Defendant, its predecessors and other property owners evidence the
Defendant's understanding and the public's practice that the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was
a public thoroughfare.
a. On May 30,1974, Defendant deeded a four foot easement to the City of St.
George which was added to an existing 46 foot right-of-way easement the
City held, making a total 50 foot easement. The May 30,1974 warranty deed
specifically refers to the subject road and states that: "[t]he following
described property to be added to and be part of an existing roadway, to be
used by the grantee as and for a public roadway and easement for utilities."
(emphasis added). The grantee on the deed was the City of St. George. The
"existing roadway" referred to was the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. See
Affidavit of David Elweese, % 6 and A.4.1 attached which is a certified copy
of the subject deed. A certified copy of the original 46 foot Right-of-Way
Easement is attached as Exhibit A.4.2 thereto.
b. Defendant incorporated in its right-of-way easement to the City of St. George,
see copy attached as Exhibit A.4.2, the 1020 West X 1050 North Street,
specifically granting the easement within the road by describing the easement
as going up "to the west line of a 46 foot road; thence south 0° 36'20" east
1199.00 feet along said west line of road." And further describing the east
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and west portion of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street by stating that the
easement was within the 50 feet "to the south line of a 50 foot road" and
continuing "East 445.50 feet along said South line of road." See Affidavit of
David Elweese and Exhibit A.4.2 thereto. This road described in the legal
description as referenced above is the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. See
Affidavit of David Elweese, f 7, and Exhibit A.4.2 thereto.
c. Similarly, on May 30,1974, the then owners of the property shown as "SG-62-14-2217," Jerry, Carolyn and Brent Atkin, deeded the east four feet of their
property to the City of St. George, "to be used by the grantee as and for a
public roadway and easement for utilities." See Affidavit of David Elweese, f
8, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.4.3 thereto.
d. Again on May 30,1974, then owners of the property shown as "SG-6-2-142218," Anthony and Nina Atkin, deeded the east four feet of their property to
the City of St. George "to be used by the grantee as and for a public roadway
and easement for utilities." See Affidavit of David Elweese, f 9, and Exhibits
A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.4 thereto.
e. On May 30,1974, then owners of the property identified as "SG-6-2-142219," LaVar and Leah Bracken, likewise deeded the east four feet of their
property to the City of St. George "to be used by the grantee as and for a
public roadway and easement for utilities." See Affidavit of David Elweese, %
10, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.5 thereto.
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f.

Again on May 30,1974, then owners of the property identified as "SG-6-214-2220," Sherrell and Jeri Newby and Kenneth and Sherrell Newby, deeded
the east four feet of their property to the City of St. George "to be used by the
grantee as and for a public roadway and easement for utilities." See Affidavit
of David Elweese, f 11, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.6 thereto.

g. When Defendant sold the property identified in the Affidavit of David
Elweese in Exhibit A.2.2 as "SG-6-2-14-2317," they specifically incorporated
the 1020 West X 1050 North Street into the legal description of the property
and referred to it as a road, not an easement, by stating that the southeast
corner of that lot starts "on the west line of a 46 foot road," and then runs
north "100 feet along said West line of road" to the south line of 1230 North
Street in St. George. See Affidavit of David Elweese, ^f 12, and Exhibits
A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.7 thereto.
h. When Defendant deeded the property identified by tax serial number in the
Affidavit of David Elweese in Exhibit A.2.2 as "SG-6-2-14-2218," they again
incorporated the subject road as part of the legal description and referred to it
as a road, not an easement, by stating that the northeast corner of that lot lies
"on the West line of a 46 foot road," and that the east boundary of the lot runs
"100.00 feet along said West line of road." Affidavit of David Elweese, ^j 13,
and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.8 thereto.
i. Again, when Defendant deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of
David Elweese in Exhibit A.2.2 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2219," it
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identified that property by specifically referring to the 1020 West X 1050
North Street as a road. The southeast corner of that property begins "at a
point on the West line of a 46.00 foot road," and the east boundary of that
property runs north from that point "100 feet along said West line of road."
See Affidavit of David Elweese, f 14, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.9
thereto.
j.

When Defendant deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of David
Elweese in Exhibit A.2.2 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2220," it once
again incorporated the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a road not an
easement. The northeast corner of that lot begins "at a point on the West line
of a 46.00 foot Road," and runs south "100 feet along said West line of road."
See Affidavit of David Elweese, % 15, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.10
thereto.

k. On the south end of the 1020 West X 1050 North road, when Defendant
deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of David Elweese in Exhibit
A.2.1 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2221," Defendant identified that
property by referring to the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a road. The
northeast corner of that property begins on the "South line of a 50.00 foot
Road, and then runs west "205.50 feet along said South line of Road." See
Affidavit of David Elweese, % 16, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.4.11
thereto.
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1. When Defendant deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of David
Elweese in Exhibit A.2.1 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2213," it again
identified the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a road, not as an easement.
The northwest corner of that property begins at "the south line of a 50 foot
road," and then runs east "178.00 feet along said South line of Road." See
Affidavit of David Elweese, f 17, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.4.12
thereto,
m. Finally, when Defendant deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of
David Elweese in Exhibit A.2.1 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2212," it
identified the south boundary of that property as beginning on "the North line
of a 50 foot road," which is the 1020 West X 1050 North Street, and
continuing "East 178.00 feet along said North line of Road." See Affidavit of
David Elweese, f 18, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.4.13 thereto.
These facts set out above and supported by the Affidavit of David Elweese are essentially
admitted by Defendant. See Second Affidavit of Charles Welch, % 4.
18.

Defendant has refused to remove the gates blocking access to the 1020 West X

1050 North Street although Plaintiffs have made written demand to remove this gate and keep it
open. See Affidavit of Val Hafen, ff 9 and 10, and Exhibits A and B thereto.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court now enters its Conclusions of Law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action and pursue a public dedication under

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. The vast majority, if not all of the cases addressing Utah Code
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Ann. § 72-5-104, or its predecessor, involve private parties as the proponent of the public
thoroughfare. None of the parties, including Defendant, have brought to this Court's attention
any case that dismisses a public dedication suit because the moving party was not a municipality
or dismisses the suit because a municipality or governmental agency was not made party to the
suit. Moreover, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 does not limit its use to
municipalities, the state or some other governmental agency and does not require that any of the
latter be joined as a party to the suit.
2.

The testimony in the Affidavits of Conrad Bowler, Val Hafen, Ethan Bundy,

Gilbert Jennings, Mansfield Jennings and Lewis Bowler is not incompetent or lacking in
foundation merely because Defendant alleges these parties have owned or presently own
property that abuts the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. Further, Plaintiffs do not lack standing
to sue for a public dedication based upon Defendant's claim that Plaintiffs have owned or
presently own property abutting the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. First, as discussed more
specifically in this Court's Findings above, ^ 1, the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs are deemed
admitted. Plaintiffs are correct that "[i]t is not for the Court to ferret out Defendant's attempts to
controvert Plaintiffs' facts by a careful winnowing of Defendant's evidence." Plaintiffs' Reply
at 4. Second, the only evidence the Court can find to rebut the clear statement by Conrad Bowler
for example, one of the plaintiffs, in paragraph 3 of his Affidavit that he does not presently own
property that abuts the 1020 West X 1050 North Street, is a vague reference in paragraph 3 of the
Second Affidavit of Charles Welch, wherein he states: "I know that each one of them [the
Plaintiffs] has been, or in fact, is presently an adjacent property owner." That vague statement
does not provide evidence contrary to the clear statement by Conrad Bowler that he presently
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does not own property that abuts the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. Moreover, the Court does
not believe the case law should be construed to limit parties owning land that abuts a claimed
dedicated roadfromfilingsuit to establish the dedication. Rather the testimony relied on must
establish use by the public, not use by some private right which is precisely the case here. The
testimony is undisputed that the general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street.
Accordingly, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit and that the
evidence is clear under the law to render judgment in Plaintiffs' favor.
3.

To establish a public dedication within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-

104, the testimony must clearly establish that there was (1) continuous use of the 1020 West X
1050 North Street, (2) as a public thoroughfare, namely, (i) that there was passing or travel, (ii)
by the public, and (iii) the use was not by permission, and (3) that this use must have been for at
least a ten year period. See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307.310, 311 (Utah 1997).
This Court will address each of those elements in turn.
4.

The evidence is clear that use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was

continuous. The testimony presented by affidavit and unrebutted by Defendant establishes that
from approximately 1972 or 1973 until approximately two years ago, a period in excess of 30
years, the general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street without interruption. The
evidence clearly establishes that no gates limited access to the subject road or through the subject
road in any fashion. There appears to befromthe evidence a short period of time sometime
during 1985 and 1990, when Defendant put up posts in an attempt to build a gate across the 1020
West X 1050 North Street, but Defendant did not proceed with the gate following a "brief legal
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dispute," and "[a]ccess through the subject road remained unimpeded." Affidavit of Val Hafen,
f 6; see also Findings, f 5 above.
5,

The evidence is further clear that use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was

by the public during this period of time and that the public used the 1020 West X 1050 North
Street for passing or travel, namely, as a public thoroughfare. See Findings,fflj4 through 10,12
and 13. The public had a "general right of passage" through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street.
Heber City, 942 P.2d at 311. The street was not laid out or used as a private way, but as a public
way. Id. The general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as often as "they deemed
'convenient or necessary.'" AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen. 2005 UT App. 168, f 11. The 1020
West X 1050 North Street was not used as the road was used in Morris v. Blunt. In Morris, the
property owner, "plowed the road," rolled boulders from adjoining plowed land "into the road,"
closed the road for five years before the action was commenced, and otherwise evidenced that he
had no intent to dedicate the road as a public thoroughfare. Morris v. Blunt. 49 Utah 243, 250,
161 P. 1127 (1916). While the land owner's intent or consent is no longer an element under
Utah law, Heber City. 942 P.2d at 311, still the use of the road in Morris was not at the public's
convenience as use of the road clearly was in this case. Moreover, in Morris, the evidence did
not disclose how many public users there even were, nor "howfrequentlythey used the road, by
what right they traveled the road, nor the circumstances of their use" or really anything about the
public's use of the road. Morris, 49 Utah at 251. The same is not true in this case as
demonstrated by the Findings above. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the general public
used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a thoroughfare in that there was passing or travel by
the public.
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6.

Moreover, use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was not with Defendant's

permission as Defendant now conveniently argues. The facts speak differently. Though
Defendant gave implied permission for the public to travel on the 1020 West X 1050 North
Street during public events, Defendant withdrew that permission after the public events
concluded. These public events occurred only four to six times a year. Findings, f 5 above.
Yet, the evidence is clear that the general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street on
almost a daily basis. Findings,ffl|4 through 10. Clearly the general public used the 1020 West
X 1050 North Street at their convenience as opposed to Defendant's convenience. Defendant
points to no evidence whatsoever, other than its present argument of implied or express
permission, that use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was with its permission. Defendant
points to no signs or other indicia that the public had permission to use the 1020 West X 1050
North Street, and indeed stated that: "There has never been a time since 1967 up until
approximately two (2) years ago, [that] there was any necessity of blocking any traffic of any
persons not specifically members of the Dixie Riding Club, Inc., because open and free access
existed to the south, to the west and to the north." See Findings, f 15 above, and Defendant's
Answer to Request for Admission No. 14 (emphasis supplied). Defendant cannot reasonably
argue that the public had implied permission to use the 1020 West X 1050 North Street simply
because the public had "open and free access" through the street. Such open and free access
alone is not legally sufficient to grant the public permission to use the subject road, foreclosing
Plaintiffs' claim of public dedication. To the contrary, such "open and free access" is the
epitome of evidence that the general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a public
thoroughfare.
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7.

Finally, the evidence is clear that the general public's use was for at least ten

8.

Accordingly, this Court concludes that the 1020 West X 1050 North Street "is

years.

dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5104, and a Decree of Dedication should issue consistent with these Findings and Conclusions.
DATED this

*^T

day ofFgbraafy, 2006.
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT

f^Q\^A hb£ct~&A
G. Rand Beacham
District Judge
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JENNINGS INVESTMENT, LC, GILBERT
JENNINGS, MANSFIELD JENNINGS,
CONRAD BOWLER, LEWIS J. AND
DORCUS N. BOWLER, H. VAL HAFEN,
RANDY AND GAI BOWLER, TROY AND
KERRIE BOWLER, JOHN BOWLER,
Plaintiffs,
v.

DECREE OF DEDICATION

Civil No. 030500781
Judge: G. Rand Beacham

DIXIE RIDING CLUB, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH
20,
Defendants.
This Court having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
finding good cause therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the following real
property to the extent owned by Dixie Riding Club, Inc., is dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, which property is located in
Washington County, State of Utah, and is more particularly described as follows:

Beginning at a point North 0°36'20" West 515.18 feet along the Section
Line from the Southeast Comer of Section 14, Township 42 South,
Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South
89°33' West 425.44 feet to a point of curvature of a 20.00 foot radius
curve to the left; thence along the arc of said curve 31.47 feet to a point
on 1100 West Street; thence along said city street North 0°36'20" West
90.24 feet to a point on a 20.245 foot radius curve to the left (center
bears North 89°23'40" East); thence Southeasterly along the arc of said
curve 31.75 feet to a point of a tangency; thence North 89°33' East
345.22 feet to a point of curvature of a 30.00 foot radius curve to the
left; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve 47.205 feet to a
point of tangency; thence North 0°36'20" West 1148.73 feet to a point of
curvature of a 20.245 foot radius curve to the left; thence North westerly
along the arc of said curve 31.75 feet to a point on a county road; thence
along said county road North 89°33' East 24.19 feet to the point of a
209.40 foot radius curve to the right (center bears S 0°27'00" E); thence
Southeasterly along the arc of said curve 78.39 feet to a point on a
22.316 foot radius curve to the left (center bears S 21°00' W); thence
along the arc of said curve 43.47 feet to a point of tangency, said point
being on the Section Line; thence along said Section Line South
0°36'20" East 1213.67 feet to the point of beginning Containing 1.901
Acres.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this dedication and
abandonment to the public is effective immediately upon entry of this Decree of Dedication with
the clerk of this Court.
DATED this

" ^

day of Febriiy, 2006.
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT

G. Rand Beacham
District Judge

Decree of Dedication

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the <f ^?"

day of February, 2006,1 caused a true and correct

copy of the unsigned DECREE OF DEDICATION to be hand delivered to the following:
Alan Boyack, Esq.
205 E. Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Secretary
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H
Briefs and Other Related Documents
Renfro v. mcCowanD.Utah,2006.Only the Westlaw
citation is currently available.
United States District Court,D. Utah,Central
Division.
Hal D. RENFRO, Trustee of the Renfro Family
Trust, Plaintiff,
v.
Milo McCOWAN, et al., Defendants.
No.2:05-CV-00498.
Nov. 9, 2006.
E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff.
Gary G. Kuhlmann, St. George, UT, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PAUL G. CASSELL, District Judge.
*1 This case requires the court to determine
whether an informal road that traverses through
both defendants' and plaintiffs land has been
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public.
Plaintiff Hal D. Renfro ("Renfro") believes that he
has presented clear and convincing evidence that
the informal road in issue (the "Road") has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period of ten years, and has thus been abandoned
and dedicated to the use of the public. Defendants
argue that Renfro has failed to meet this burden
because of an alleged lack of evidence showing that
the Road has been used continuously for ten years,
and an alleged dispute as to whether it is, in deed,
the "public" that has used the Road. The court
agrees with Renfro that he has presented clear and
convincing evidence that the Road has been
dedicated to the public. Consequently, the court
GRANTS his motion for summary judgment (# 53)
in so far as the court finds that the Road has been
abandoned and dedicated to the use of the public.
Also before the court is a motion for partial

summary judgment filed by defendants (# 61). In
addition to addressing the Road issue in their brief,
defendants argue that some of the named parties
have been wrongfully named as defendants in this
action. The court finds that all of the named
defendants have an interest in the Road, either as
owners of the land directly affected by the Road or
simply as potential future users of the Road. The
court's holding on the Road issue does not involve
damages. Moreover,
the named
defendant
responsible for the alleged trespass and grading of
Renfro's property, the only issue in this case that
may result in damages, has offered to restore the
Renfro land to its original condition. Consequently,
the court DENIES defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment (# 61). The court's granting of
Renfro's motion for summary judgment effectively
closes this case. All claims having been resolved,
the court directs the Clerk's Office to close this case.

BACKGROUND
When considering a motion for summary judgment,
the court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.™1 Viewed in
this light, the record reflects the following facts.

FN1. Cortez v. McCauley, 438 F.3d 980,
988 (10th Cir.2006).
A. The Renfro Property
Renfro is the owner in trust of a parcel of land (the "
Point") on the top of a ridge that overlooks the
Green Valley Golf Course in St. George, Utah. It
may go without stating that the Point is located on
the point of the ridge. On June 28, 2005, Renfro
deeded property working down the "back" and "
sides" of the Point to a real estate development firm
not currently involved in this case. Although no
access right-of-way was retained by Renfro with
regard to the transfer of land to the real estate
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development firm, Renfro contends that access to
the Point from this transferred land is impractical
due to the steep terrain. The "frontside" of the Point
currently borders land owned by Defendant QRS,
Inc. ("QRS"). Renfro believes that the Point could
be developed within the requirements of local laws
and regulations for one or two residential lots worth
several hundred thousand dollars each.

Road ends in a cul-de-sac at the lots bordering the
Renfro property, and has been labeled Pike Circle.
The cul-de-sac destroys the bottom part of the loop
at the end of the Road, disconnecting the remainder
of the loop from the rest of the Road of which it is a
part. In the course of construction of the Highlands,
Quality Excavation, under contract to QRS, entered
the Point and graded and removed a portion of the
Point's surface. Quality Excavation subsequently
offered to restore the Point to its original condition.

B. The QRS Property
*2 QRS is an owner or developer of the Highlands
Green Valley subdivision (the "Highlands") in St.
George, Utah. Defendant Milo McCowan ("
McCowan") is a partner in both QRS and Castle
Rock Development of Southern Utah, LLC, ("
Castle Rock") two companies that consist of the
same members. In the Fall of 2003, Castle Rock
purchased the parcel of land currently being
developed as the Highlands from the Kay Traveller
Development Company. Kay Traveller owned this
property for at least ten years prior to the
conveyance to Castle Rock. Shortly after the
acquisition, Castle Rock deeded the land to QRS.
The QRS property borders the Renfro property at
the southeast corner of the Highlands. The southeast
quadrant of the Highlands
is a steep,
southeast-trending ridge that leads to the Point.
QRS has platted three lots that would come within
about 120 feet of the Renfro property. More
importantly, these three platted lots are located over
the Road where it reaches the Point.
C The Road
In the vicinity of the Highlands and the Point are a
number of informal, unpaved roads that connect to
various public ways. The informal road at issue-the
Road-extends along the ridge of the Highlands and
ends in a loop around the perimeter of the Point.
The loop is formed around the outer limits of the
flat surface of the Point, and reconnects with the
Road of which it is a part.
QRS has platted the Highlands to utilize the Road
as an access to many of the lots. The improved

Renfro has provided aerial photographs from 1978,
1985, and 2004, which show the existence of the
Road. The Road can be plainly seen in all three
photographs. Gary Esplin and McCowan, two
long-time residents of St. George, both confirmed
that the 1985 and 2004 photographs accurately
depict the Road and its surrounding area. As a
long-time resident of St. George, McCowan also
noted that the area around the Road has been
notorious for four-wheelers and motorcycles to ride.
Having raised his kids in that area from 1980
through 1988, McCowan referred to the area of the
Road as "four-wheeler heaven for the kids." FN2
Mr. Esplin is also aware that the area has been used
for such purposes.

FN2. McCowan Dep. 15:2-3, Apr. 18,
2006.
Speaking specifically about the Road, McCowan
testified that "it's a place where people used to drive
out and drive to the end, and once they got to the
end, they had no place to go but turn around and
come back out. It's a view spot." FN3 McCowan
noted that people would go and look off that point
much like they would look off other points. Jack
Willis, another long-time resident/visitor of the
area, is the owner of an interest in a Sports Village
condominium located in the general vicinity of the
Road. He has observed that the Road has been used
frequently over the past twenty-one years by all
types of outdoor vehicles. Mr. Willis, himself, has
often used the Road over this twenty-one year
period.

FN3.W. 18:1-5.
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*3 Mr. Traveller, in his affidavit, states that neither
he nor his company ever permitted the public to
come onto his property, or attempted to deter
anyone from use of the Road. Moreover, McCowan
was unaware of any barriers or blockage to use of
the trails in the area of the Road for the entire time
that he has been familiar with the area.
Based upon these facts, Renfro argues that he has
satisfied his burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the Road has been
dedicated to public use. QRS contends that Renfro
has failed to establish undisputed facts which would
support summary judgment on this issue. In
addition to the Road dispute, Renfro argues that
defendants have graded and removed soil from its
property without permission and in trespass.
Because Quality Excavation has offered to restore
the laud affected by its trespass and grading of the
Point, FN4 the court will limit its discussion to the
issue of the potential public thoroughfare.
FN4. Tomaiko Dep. 37:17-25; 38:21-39:6,
Apr. 18, 2006; Def.'s Status Report, Aug.
21, 2006 (Docket No. 66); PL's Mem.
Supp. Summ. J. 7 (Docket No. 56).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." FN5 In evaluating a
motion for summary judgment, the evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom should be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, in this case the defendants.*^6 Utah law
requires that dedication of a road as a public road
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. FN7
The "burden of establishing public use for the
required period of time is on those claiming it." FN8

FN5. Fed.RCiv.P. Rule 56(c).

F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir .1998).
FN7. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo,
888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) (citing
Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639, 639
(Utah 1972)).
FN8. Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine
Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213
(Utah 1981).
DISCUSSION
Renfro seeks summary judgment on the grounds
that QRS has platted a portion of the Highlands
over, and otherwise destroyed an established public
thoroughfare-the Road-leading to the Renfro
property. McCowan contends that the Road is not a
public thoroughfare because Renfto has failed to
show that the Road has been used continuously by
the public for a ten year period. The court is
persuaded that Renfro has met his burden and that
summary judgment in his favor is proper.
Under Utah law, "[a] highway is dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period of ten years." FN9 Accordingly, courts
interpreting this statute (or its similar predecessor)
require proof of the following three elements before
finding that a road has been abandoned to the
public: there must be (1) continuous use, (2) as a
public thoroughfare, (3) for a period often years. mi°
The definition of public thoroughfare consists
of the following: "(0 Where must be 'passing or
travel,' (ii) the 'use must be by the public/ (iii) use
by permission does not constitute use as a public
thoroughfare ..." F N U As noted above, Utah law
requires that dedication of a public road be proven
by
cleat
and
convincing
evidence.™12
Consequently, Renfro has the burden to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the Road has
been abandoned to the public. The court is
persuaded that Renfro has met this burden.

FN9. Utah Code Ann.
(2001).

FN6. Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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FN 10. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942
P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997).
FN11. Id. at 311 (quoting Morris v. Blunt,
161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916)).
FN12. Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099
(citing Thomson, 493 P.2d at 639).
A. Continuous Use for Ten Years
*4 The first and third elements of the test require
Renfro to provide clear and convincing evidence
that the Road has been used continuously for a
period of ten years. "[Continuous use of a road
exists when 'the public ... made a continuous and
uninterrupted use' not necessarily every day, but '
as often as they found it convenient or necessary/ "
FNJ3 Furthermore, "use may be continuous though
not constant ... provided it occurred as often as the
claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere
intermission is not interruption." FN14

kids." mi6 Speaking specifically about the Road,
McCowan testified that "it's a place where people
used to drive out and drive to the end, and once they
got to the end, they had no place to go but turn
around and come back out. It's a view spot." FN17
Renfro also supplied the court with an affidavit
from Jack Willis, in which he states: "In the
twenty-one years that I have owned property
nearby, I have observed that this loop has been used
continuously and frequently by all types of outdoor
vehicles approaching from the northwest to exploit
the view from the end of the point. I have often used
the Road and the loop as described over this period.
» FN18

FN15. McCowan Dep. 14:21-22.
FN16.A/. 15:2-3.
FN17.M 18:1-5.
FN18. Willis Aff.H 7.

FN13. AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 112
P.3d 1228, 1230 (Utah Ct.App.2005)
(quoting Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107,
109 (Utah 1958)).
FN14. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962
P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct.App.1998)
(citation omitted).
Renfro has provided aerial photographs from 1978,
1985, and 2004, which show the existence of the
Road. The Road is plainly visible in all three
photographs. McCowan and Esplin both confirmed
that the 1985 and 2004 photographs accurately
depict the Road and the area surrounding the Road.
While this evidence might not be enough by itself to
show continuous use, Renfro has produced affidavit
and deposition testimony supporting what the
photographs plainly suggest. In addition to
confirming the accurateness of the photographs,
McCowan also testified that "this [area] has been a
notorious area for four-wheelers and motorcycles to
ride." FN15 McCowan, having raised his kids in
that area from 1980 through 1988, referred to the
area of the Road as "four-wheeler heaven for the

The aerial photographs, coupled with the affidavit
of Jack E. Willis and depositions of McCowan and
Esplin, provide clear and convincing evidence that
the Road has been used continuously for at least ten
years.
B. Use as a Public Thoroughfare
The next element for discussion is whether the Road
has been used as a public thoroughfare. The Utah
Supreme Court has established three requirements
that must be satisfied before a road qualifies as a
public thoroughfare: "(i) [t]here must be 'passing or
travel,' (ii) the 'use must be by the public,' (iii) use
by permission does not constitute use as a public
thoroughfare...." As displayed above, Renfro has
submitted clear and convincing evidence that there
has been "travel" on the Road. The court, as more
fully discussed below, is also persuaded that Renfro
has produced clear and convincing evidence
showing that the Road was used by the public,
without the permission of the private landowners.
When determining whether it is the public that has

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 6 of7

Slip Copy

Page 5

Slip Copy, 2006 WL 3254509 (D.Utah)
(Cite as: Slip Copy)
used a potential public thoroughfare, it is necessary
to first define "public." The Utah Court of Appeals
has noted the importance to distinguish "between
use of a road by owners of adjoining property and
by the general public. 'Such property owners
cannot be considered members of the public
generally, as that term generally is used in
dedication by user statutes.' " FN19 The reasoning
behind this distinction "is because adjoining owners
may have documentary or prescriptive rights to use
the road or their use may be by permission of the
owners of the fee of the road." FN2 ° Consequently,
the "public" includes those normally recognized as
being the public, with the exception of owners of
adjoining property and those using the road by
permission.

FN19. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910,
913 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (quoting Peterson
v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545, 546 (Utah 1968)).
FN20. Id.
*5 The record provides clear and convincing
evidence that the continuous use of the Road has
been by members of the public. In his affidavit,
Jack Willis states that the Road has been used "by
all types of outdoor vehicles approaching from the
northwest to exploit the view from the end of the
FN21
In addition to observing this traffic,
point.'*
Mr. Willis states that he has often used the Road
over the twenty-one years that he has resided in the
area. FN22 Mr. Willis clearly does not qualify as an
adjacent landowner. FN23 McCowan admitted that
individuals used the Road to find a view spot,
noting that "it's a place where people used to drive
out and drive to the end, and once they got to the
end, they had no place to go but turn around and
come back out." FN24 He states that "people would
go out and look off that point as they would other
points." FN25 Additionally, McCowan testified that
the area around the Road "has been a notorious area
for four-wheelers and motorcycles to ride" FN26
and that the area was "four-wheeler heaven" for his
own kids.FN27
FN21.WillisAff.H7.

FN22. Id.
FN23. See Kohler, 916 P.2d at 913.
FN24. McCowan Dep. 18:1-4.
FN25.W. 23:9-10.
FN26.W. 14:21-22.
FN27. Id. 15:2-3.
Commingled with the second prong involving use
by the public, is the third prong regarding
permissive use. Under Utah law, "permissive use
cannot result in either adverse possession or
dedication of private property to the public." FN28
Renfro has produced clear and convincing evidence
to show that the individuals using the Road did not
have permission. In his affidavit, Mr. Traveller
states: "Neither I nor my company ever permitted or
attempted to deter anyone from [use of the Road]. I
never observed anyone else attempt to deter such
use." FN29 Mr. Traveller states further that to the
best of his knowledge, "the public would have had
unobstructed use of this road throughout the period
the Highlands property was owned by [his]
company." FN3 ° Moreover, McCowan was
unaware of any barriers or blockage to use of the
trails in the area of the Road for the entire time that
he has been familiar with the area.

FN28. Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809.
FN29. Traveller Aff.H 5.
FN30.MU4.
Accordingly, the unobstructed use of the Road by
Mr. Willis, coupled with the evidence of
unobstructed and constant use by numerous
recreationists and sightseers, provides clear and
convincing evidence that the users were not
adjacent landowners, but members of the public
enjoying the outdoors. Renfro, therefore, has
provided clear and convincing evidence that the
Road was a public thoroughfare for the purposes of
Utah Code § 72-5-104.

© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 7 <

Slip Copy

Page 6

Slip Copy, 2006 WL 3254509 (D.Utah)
(Cite as: Slip Copy)
The court finds that Renfro has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the Road has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period of ten years.

C. Other Issues
Defendants point to case law in which the court
gives considerable weight to the issue of how a
potential public thoroughfare
was
created.
Defendants argue that under Utah law, if a trail was
created by a past property owner as a private way, "
it's use, however long, as a private way, does not
make it a public way; and the mere fact that the
public also make use of it, without objection from
the owner of the land, will not make it a public way.
Before it becomes public in character the owner of
the land must consent to the change." FN31
Defendants' reliance on this case law is unhelpful
for two reasons. First, defendants admit that the "
trails at issue in this case were not established to
access any specific portions of property for the
benefit of any property owner." FN32 Second, and
more conclusive, this rule of law has been overruled
in a subsequent Utah Supreme Court decision.™33

FN31. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1131
(Utah 1916) (quoting Byron K. Elliott &
William F. Elliott, A Treatise on the Law
of Roads and Streets § 5 (1890)).

as defendants in this action (# 61). The court's
holding on the Road issue affected each of the
named defendants, and because there are no
damages involved in light of Quality Excavation's
offer to restore the Renfro property to its original
condition, the court finds it unnecessary to address
defendants' jurisdictional issues in their motion for
partial summary judgment. Consequently, the court
DENIES defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment (# 61). All claims having been resolved,
the court directs the Clerk's Office to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
D.Utah,2006.
Renfro v. mcCowan
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 3254509 (D.Utah)
Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top)
• 2005 WL 3198219 (Trial Motion, Memorandum
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Summary Judgment (Nov. 7, 2005) Original Image
of this Document (PDF)
• 2005 WL 3198217 (Trial Motion, Memorandum
and Affidavit) Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment (Oct. 17, 2005) Original Image of this
Document (PDF)
• 2:05cv00498 (Docket) (Jun. 14, 2005)
END OF DOCUMENT

FN32. Def.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J. 3.
FN33. Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099.
CONCLUSION
*6 Because Mr. Renfro has provided clear and
convincing evidence that the Road has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period of ten years, Renfro's motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED (# 53) in so far as the court
declares that the Road has been abandoned and
dedicated to the use of the public. As mentioned
above, QRS has motioned the court for partial
summary judgment to remove some of the named
parties that have allegedly been wrongfully named
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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McHUGH, Judge:
ifl
Wasatch County (Wasatch) appeals the trial court's ruling
that principles of estoppel prevent it from exercising control
over roads, located on land owned by West Daniels Land
Association (the Association) and E. Ray Okelberry, Brian
Okelberry, and Eric Okelberry (collectively, the Okelberrys), 1

1. The Association owns property immediately adjacent to
property owned by the Okelberrys. As members and shareholders in
the Association, the Okelberrys used the Association's land in
(continued...)

that were adjudicated abandoned and dedicated to the public. The
Okelberrys cross-appeal the trial court's determination that the
roads were dedicated to the public under Utah Code section 72-5104(1). See. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001). We affirm in
part and reverse and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
f2
In 195 7, the Okelberrys2 purchased a tract of rural,
undeveloped property in Wasatch County. The property is criss-

1. ( ...continued)
conjunction with their own for grazing livestock. The
Association was initially included in the suit as a defendant.
However, for reasons not clear from the record, it withdrew from
the litigation. After the Association failed to appoint
successor counsel, Wasatch sought default judgment against the
Association. The Okelberrys opposed the motion and argued that
as members of the Association they had the right to represent its
interests at trial. The trial court did not directly enter a
ruling on Wasatch's default judgment motion. Later, the court
noted that default judgment had been entered against the
Association in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
However, the trial court had allowed the Okelberrys to submit
evidence with respect to the roads located on both the
Okelberrys' and the Association's properties at trial.
Additionally, the trial court adjudicated the status of the roads
located on the Association's property, implicitly rejecting
Wasatch's argument that the Okelberrys lacked standing to
represent the Association's interests. See Zions First Nat. Bank
v. C'Est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1980) (recognizing
that trial courts implicitly deny motions where later judgment is
in conflict with and fails to give effect to the motions).
Because Wasatch has not appealed the issue of the Okelberrys'
standing to represent the interests of the Association, this
court addresses the merits without distinguishing between the
Okelberrys' and the Association's properties. See Whitmer v.
City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226, 228 n.l (Utah 1997) (declining to
address issue not appealed).
2. The tract was initially purchased by E. Ray Okelberry, his
brother, Lee Okelberry, and their father, Roy Okelberry.
Sometime after 1957, Ray and Lee Okelberry bought their father's
interest in the property. And later, when Lee decided to retire,
Ray's sons, Eric and Brian Okelberry, bought Lee's interest. At
the present time, Ray, Eric, and Brian Okelberry own the property
and continue to use it for their livestock operation.
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crossed by a series of unimproved dirt roads including the four
roads at issue in this appeal: the Thorton Hollow Road, Ridge
Line Road, Parker Canyon Road, and Circle Springs Road (the Four
Roads) .3 The Four Roads begin and end at points outside the
Okelberrys' property or are connected to roads that begin and end
outside the property. At the time the property was purchased, it
was bordered on the east and south by fences, separating the
Okelberrys' property from United States Forest Service property.
There were also multiple wire gates along the Four Roads such
that persons traveling on the Four Roads generally had to open
the gates before proceeding within the boundaries of the
Okelberrys• property.
%3
Sometime in 198 9, the Okelberrys started barring public use
of the Four Roads by constantly locking the gates and posting no
trespassing signs. In the mid-1990s, the Okelberrys placed their
property into a Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit (CWMU) that
allowed them to realize a profit from exclusive hunting
activities on the property. In 2001, twelve years after the
Okelberrys began permanently locking the gates, Wasatch initiated
suit to have the Four Roads declared public highways under Utah
Code section 72-5-104. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104.4 Under
that provision, "[a] highway is dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Id. § 72-5-104(1).
1(4 After a three-day bench trial, the court entered findings of
fact and conclusions of law. First, the court "specifically
found that there was not public use of the [Four Roads] in the
194 0s or before and also . . . no evidence of vehicular use prior
to the 1950s." The court also specifically found that Wasatch
had never performed any maintenance on the Four Roads.

3. The initial suit included a fifth road, Maple Canyon Road,
which the trial court determined had not been abandoned to the
public. Because neither party appeals the trial court's decision
with respect to Maple Canyon Road, it is not addressed here.
4. An earlier version of this provision, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 27-12-89 (1995), was in effect at the time Wasatch claims
dedication or abandonment of the Four Roads occurred. However,
the current version, see id. § 72-5-104(1) (2001), is
"substantively identical" to the earlier version. State v. Six
Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104,14 n.3, 132 P.3d 687. Therefore,
in the interests of convenience, all references and citations
will be to the current version. See id.
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Turning to the evidence and testimony presented at trial,
the court noted that Wasatch had presented witnesses, members of
the general public, who testified that for different periods of
time between 1957 and 1989 they freely used the Four Roads. The
court noted that the Okelberrys' witnesses alternatively
testified that beginning in the 1960s, the gates on the Four
Roads were generally kept closed and "periodically locked for
several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the
gates and property which stated 'No Trespassing--Private
Property.'" Additionally, employees of the Okelberrys testified
that they had, at times, asked people trespassing on the property
or the roads to leave. After weighing the evidence, the court
assumed the truth of the Okelberrys1 factual assertions and
nonetheless determined that it was "clear that individuals using
the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or
early 1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the
roads freely, and though not constantly, they used the roads
continuously as they needed."
16
The court also found that the majority of users were members
of the general public, traveling without permission, and
therefore used the Four Roads as a public thoroughfare. Finally,
without defining exactly which ten years the Four Roads were used
continuously as public thoroughfares, the court determined that
between 1960 and 1990, public use "continued for at least ten
years, if not much longer, or for multiple periods of ten years."
Thus, the court concluded that the Four Roads had been dedicated
to public use "well over ten years prior to 1989 when the
Okelberrys began [permanently] locking the gates."
%7 Although determining that the roads had been abandoned and
dedicated to the public, the court found that Wasatch was
equitably estopped from enforcing the dedication on behalf of the
public. The court supported the estoppel determination with two
findings. First, that "for a period of twelve years [the
Okelberrys] exerted control and used the roads in an openly
hostile manner to the public use of the streets." And second,
although "little improvements have been made to the roads
themselves," the Okelberrys had expended "large amounts of time
and money" on their sheep and cattle operations as well as
cultivated their business relationship with the CWMU. Wasatch
appeals the trial court's judgment that it is equitably estopped
from opening the Four Roads to public use, and the Okelberrys
cross-appeal the trial court's ruling that the Four Roads are
public roads by dedication.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
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f8
The Okelberrys challenge the trial court's determination
that the Four Roads were abandoned and dedicated to the public
under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5104(1). "The trial court's ultimate conclusion that the facts of
this case either satisfy or do not satisfy the requirements of
section 72-5-104(1) is a mixed question of fact and law, which we
review for correctness." State v. Six Mile Ranch Co.. 2006 UT
App 104,1(9, 132 P.3d 687 (citing Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942
P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997)). However, because the legal
requirements of a public highway determination under section 725-104(1) are "highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous," we
"give[] trial courts a fair degree of latitude in determining the
legal consequences . . . of facts found by the court." Id.
(quotations and citation omitted); accord Heber City Corp., 942
P.2d at 309-10. "'Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's
decision regarding whether a public highway has been established
under section f72-5-104 (1)1 , we review the decision for
correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its
application of the facts to the statute . ' " Six Mile Ranch Co. ,
2006 UT App 104 at %9 (alteration in original) (quoting Heber
City Corp.. 942 P.2d at 310).
%9
The Okelberrys also challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, arguing that Wasatch has not provided clear and
convincing evidence of continuous use as a public thoroughfare.
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). "To establish the dedication
of a public road, we require clear and convincing evidence."
AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168,17, 112 P.3d 1228
(citing Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 639
(1972)). Where a party challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, "[a]n appellate court must launch any review of factual
findings from rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
its clearly erroneous test . . . ." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54,1^2829, 561 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (quotations omitted) ; see also Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact . . . shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."). Although it is appropriate for a "reviewing court
to consider the standard of proof the prevailing party below was
required to meet," the trial court's findings of fact will only
be reversed under the clearly erroneous standard embodied in rule
52(a) where a review of the record as a whole demonstrates the
result is "against the clear weight of the evidence or leave[s]
the appellate court with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54 at 140; see also
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle
Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).
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tlO Alternatively, Wasatch argues that the trial court erred
when it applied equitable estoppel to bar its future attempts to
open the Four Roads to public use. "[W]hether the trial court
committed reversible error in applying the doctrine of equitable
estoppel" to a public road determination is a question of law,
which is "reviewed for correctness without any special
deference." Western Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1377-78.
ANALYSIS
I.

Dedication to the Public

Kll Under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1), "[a] highway is
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten
years." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). Thus, for a road to
become a public highway under the statute, three elements must be
met, "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public
thoroughfare, (iii) for a period of ten years." Heber City
Corp., 942 P.2d at 310, quoted in Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App
104 at 111.
\\2
The Okelberrys argue that the trial court's findings of fact
were not supported by clear and convincing evidence; therefore,
its conclusions that the Four Roads had been used continuously as
public thoroughfares were in error. We will address each of
these elements in turn, noting, however, that although each
element "embodies a logically distinct requirement that must be
satisfied, the elements are so intertwined that they are not
readily susceptible to separate discussion." Id. at 310 n.6.
A.

Continuous Use

113 Under Utah law, continuous use of a road exists when "'the
public, even though not consisting of a great many persons, made
a continuous and uninterrupted use1 not necessarily every day,
but 'as often as they found it convenient or necessary.1" AWINC
Corp., 2005 UT App 168 at \ \ \ (quoting Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d
395, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (1958)). It is not required that public
use be constant, rather it need only to have "'occurred as often
as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. . . . Mere
intermission is not interruption.'" Id. (omission in original)
(quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah
1977) ) .
114 The Okelberrys argue that the evidence of continuous use of
the Four Roads was not clear and convincing because, at trial,
they presented unrebutted evidence showing that the Okelberrys
had expelled persons who lacked permission to use the roads and
controlled access to the roads through closed gates that were
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periodically locked. At the heart of the Okelberrys1 argument is
the proposition that uncontested evidence of a closed or locked
gate across a road, or a single instance where a party is ejected
from the road, is an interruptive event sufficient to defeat any
claim of continuous use by the public as a matter of law. While
acknowledging the ease of application of such a bright-line test,
we disagree.
Hl5 In making public road determinations, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated that "all of the facts should be considered together,
and where there is dispute about whether a public use is
established, determination of the facts and resolution of the
issue is primarily the responsibility of the trial court."
Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966)
(emphasis added). Prior cases have recognized that the presence
of gates, including the frequencies with which they are closed or
locked, is a factor to be weighed heavily in making the
continuous use determination. See, e.g., Campbell v. Box Elder
County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (taking into
account that road had been "generally barred by a locked gate,"
as well as testimony that the public "had been unable to use the
road because of the gate"). Nonetheless, the presence of
obstructions or gates, open or closed, unlocked or locked, has
been treated as only one of the many factors a trial court may
consider when determining if the public use was continuous. See
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981) (affirming trial
court's determination of public road despite finding that road
was "periodically block[ed]" during the relevant time). Indeed,
the Utah Supreme Court has declined opportunities to rely solely
on the presence of a gate, locked or unlocked, to affirm trial
courts' determinations that roads have not been dedicated to the
public. See Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639,
640-41 (1972) (weighing presence of gates, locked and unlocked,
along with signage, lack of governmental maintenance, nature of
use, and character of users in finding road was not abandoned);
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426, 427 (1964)
(relying on evidence of gates, as well as signs, grants of
permission, past litigation initiated by the property owners
alleging private road, and contracts for exclusive use); cf.
Wilhelm v. Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., 2001 UT App 285U, No.
20000559-CA, 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 131, at *3-*4 (Oct. 4, 2001)
(per curiam) (noting that the owners had blocked access to the
road several times but also weighing character of users and
nature of use); Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (examining evidence of
locked gate and testimony by members of the public who had been
unable to use the road because of the gate). While we leave open
the possibility that evidence that a road was blocked by a locked
gate may weigh heavily enough, given the other facts and
circumstances, to be dispositive of the question of continuous
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use, we do not accept the Okelberrys1 argument that any evidence
of a locked gate, no matter how brief, is conclusive evidence of
interrupted use.
fl6 Strong policy considerations underlie public highway
determinations governed by Utah Code section 72-5-104. Utah
appellate courts have noted that because "the ownership of
property should be granted a high degree of sanctity and
respect," Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah
1995), "dedication of property to public use should not be
lightly presumed," Thurman, 626 P.2d at 448. In consideration of
this policy, the Utah Supreme Court has placed the burden of
proving the existence of a public road by clear and convincing
evidence on the party seeking the dedication. See Draper City,
888 P.2d at 1099 ("This higher standard of proof is demanded
since the ownership of property should be granted a high degree
of sanctity and respect.").
fl7 However, adopting the test urged by the Okelberrys would
disrupt the delicate balance embodied in the clear and convincing
standard. If a property owner was able to defeat a dedication
claim by simply providing self-serving testimony that at some
point she interrupted use of a road by locking a gate for a
single short period of time within a ten-year period or ejecting
a single person from the road, the dedication statute would be
eviscerated. Cf. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d
545, 546-47 (1968) (reversing trial court's determination of
dedication where evidence was almost exclusively provided by
self-serving witnesses "having their own special and private
interests in the road"); Bonner, 417 P.2d at 648 ("Resolution of
[a dedication] issue cannot rest entirely upon what the owner
says was his intent. In case controversy arises he can always
avow that his intent was in accord with his interest." (footnote
omitted)). At the same time, we note the difficulty property
owners face in locating disinterested witnesses to testify that
they were prevented from using the roads at their convenience or
the time of their choosing because they met with a locked gate or
were turned away.5 It is precisely for these reasons that a
trial court is given great latitude in weighing the facts in
light of the credibility and motivation of witnesses when
determining if use of a road by the public was continuous. See
Petersen, 438 P.2d at 549 (Crockett, C.J., dissenting) (noting

5. These failed attempts to use the road
property owners. Even in cases where the
a member of the public, he is unlikely to
or contact information that could be used
of the public for trial.
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may be unknown to the
property owner ejected
retain identification
to subpoena the member

that "it is the prerogative of the trial judge to determine
whether the tests [for dedication] have been met" including a
weighing of interested witness's testimony).
fl8 Thus, the question of continuous use should be approached as
a multi-faceted inquiry that requires a trial court to weigh all
the evidence presented in light of the credibility of witnesses.
We recognize that evidence of gates, and in particular locked
gates, during the relevant period is strong evidence of
interrupted use. See, e.g., Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (noting
that trial court's determination that there was not continuous
use was permissibly premised on finding that road was "generally
barred by a locked gate"); Cox v. Coxf 373 P.2d 929, 933 (Idaho
1962) ("Where gates are in existence across a road barring the
passage and making it necessary to open them in order to use the
road, the existence of such gates is considered as strong
evidence that the road was not a public road.")/ cf. Thomson, 493
P. 2d at 640-41 (discussing gates, chains, and padlocks across
road in affirming trial court's determination that dedication had
not occurred). Nonetheless, in some instances, evidence of a
gate, even a locked gate, may not weigh heavily enough to
establish that there was an interruption of continuous use. See,
e.g., Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444,1112-15 (affirming
trial court's determination of dedication even where property
owners presented evidence that gate across road had at one time
been locked). In deciding whether a locked gate acted as an
interruptive force sufficient to restart the running of the
statutory ten-year period, the trial court should weigh the
evidence regarding the duration and frequency that the gate was
locked against the frequency and volume of public use to
determine if there is clear and convincing evidence that public
use of the road was continuous.
119 In this case, the trial court balanced the frequency and
duration that the gates were locked against the frequency and
volume of public use. The trial court found that even were it to
accept as true "that beginning in the 1960s the gates were
periodically locked for several days at a time," it was
nonetheless "clear that individuals using the roads beginning in
the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s used the roads
without interruption, . . . and though not constantly, they used
the roads continuously as they needed."
120 The trial court's conclusion is supported in the record.
Several witnesses testified that they used the Four Roads during
the relevant period and were never asked to leave and never
encountered a locked gate. " [W]e do not set aside the trial
court's factual findings unless they are against the clear weight
of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and firm
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conviction that a mistake has been made." Western Kane County
Special Serv. Dist, No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co. , 744 P.2d 1376,
1377 (Utah 1987). No such conviction is held here. Clear and
convincing evidence may be premised on " [t]he testimony of one
credible witness[] if believed by the court or jury." Bonner v.
Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966). Here, the
trial court may have relied on any one of many witnesses. We do
not, therefore, disturb the trial court's conclusion that there
was continuous use.
B.

Public Thoroughfare

1|21 Three general requirements must be met to demonstrate that
the road at issue was used as a public thoroughfare: "(i)
[t]here must be passing or travel, (ii) the use must be by the
public, [and] (iii) use by permission does not constitute use as
a public thoroughfare." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d
307, 311 (Utah 1997) (quotations omitted). The Okelberrys do not
challenge the trial court's findings that there was passing or
travel nor do they challenge that the travel was engaged in by
members of the public. Rather, the Okelberrys assert that it was
error for the trial court to find that there was clear and
convincing evidence of use as a public thoroughfare because they
presented uncontested evidence that gates were maintained on the
Four Roads throughout the relevant period. More simply, the
Okelberrys argue that the mere presence of a gate, locked or
unlocked, is conclusive proof of permissive use and therefore
may, as a single inquiry, defeat a finding of public
thoroughfare. This court has rejected such a construction of
Utah law.
i|22 "It is firmly established under Utah law that permissive
use cannot result in either adverse possession or dedication of
private property to the public." Campbell v. Box Elder County,
962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Heber City Corp. ,
942 P.2d at 311-12; Thurman v. Bvram, 626 P.2d 447, 449-50 (Utah
1981)). In Campbell v. Box Elder County, we recognized that a
property owner's use of a gate was strong evidence, but not
conclusive proof, of permissive use. See 962 P.2d at 809.
There, we affirmed the trial court's determination that use was
permissive where it was supported by evidence showing "the
Campbells had unlocked the gate every year except 1994 for deer
hunting season and had relocked it at the end of each hunting
season." Id. However, we have since clarified the treatment of
gates in Campbell by explaining that it is not the presence of
the gate, alone, that indicates permissive use. See State v. Six
Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104,123, 132 P.3d 687. Instead,
Campbell stood "for the proposition that an overt act, such as
locking and unlocking a gate, provides evidence of permissive
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use." Id. While the overt act of locking and unlocking the gate
under the facts and circumstances in Campbell was an indication
of permissive use, the erection of a gate by a property owner
does not conclusively establish the character of the public use
as permissive because a gate "may be erected for purposes other
than obstruction of public travel." Mclntyre v. Board of County
Commf rs, 86 P.3d 402, 409-10 (Colo. 2004) (quotations and
citation omitted). For example, because a gate may be erected
across a public road for the purpose of controlling livestock,
see Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106 (2001), gates across roads do not
always carry an inference of permissive use. See, e.g., Lemont
Land Corp. v. Rogers, 887 P.2d 724, 728 (Mont. 1994) (noting that
where "the gate was used to control livestock, not travel," it
was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion of permissive
use) .
^[23 Therefore, !f[w]hile evidence of a fence or gate on the road
gives rise to a strong indication that any public use of the road
is permissive, their existence does not provide the landowner
with a conclusive presumption that the use is permissive."
Mclntyre, 86 P.3d at 412; see also Tomlin Enters., Inc. v.
Althoff, 2004 MT 383,fl9, 103 P.3d 1069 ("[T]he fact that the
passage of a road has been for years barred by gates or other
obstructions to be opened and closed by the parties passing over
the land, has always been considered as strong evidence in
support of a mere license to the public . . . ." (quotations and
citation omitted)). Instead, trial courts are given wide
latitude to determine if use is permissive because the "legal
requirements [of section 72-5-104], other than the ten-year
requirement, are highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous."
Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 310.
f24 The Utah Supreme Court has warned that in public road
dedication cases, appellate courts should not attempt to
"establish a coherent and consistent statement of the law on a
fact-intensive, case-by-case review of trial court rulings." Id.
Thus, under Utah law, trial courts are "permitted some reign to
grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a
. . . [public thoroughfare] determination." Kohler v. Martin,
916 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration and omission
in original) (quotations and citation omitted). Because the
trial court has significant discretion to weigh the myriad facts
that provide evidence of non-permissive use, the trial court's
determination that travel on the Four Roads was without
permission is adequately supported by the record as is its
determination that the Four Roads were used as public
thoroughfares. Several witnesses testified to using the Four
Roads for decades without seeking or obtaining permission and
without encountering locked gates. Additionally, testimony from
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both parti 3 tended to support the trial court's conclusion that
the gates *re primarily in place as a method of controlling the
Okelberry^ livestock operations, not for the purpose of
controllii public use. Both of these findings are sufficient to
sustain tl trial court's conclusion that the Four Roads were
used withe
permission as public thoroughfares. See Thurman,
626 P.2d a 449 (affirming finding of public thoroughfare and
11
noting the
[a] Ithough testimony in the instant case indicated
1
some of t
use . . . was winn permission, there was clear and
convincing
vidence of frequent and general use of the road
without d' ndants' permissi n").
125 Beca^
court was
that the t
thoroughfe
trial com
the public
Code Ann.
j udgment t
to address
appeal.

we do not have . firm conviction that the trial
staken, we do not disturb the trial court's findings
r Roads were used continuously as public
s for a period of at least ten years. We affirm the
s determination t lat the Four Roads were dedicated to
y action of Utah :ode section 72-5-104. See Utah
72-5-104(1). Upc a affirming the trial court's
t the Four Roads were public roads, it is necessary
he issue of equit able estoppel raised by Wasatch on
II.

Equitable Estoppel

challenges the trial court's determination that
i|26 Wasat
Wasatch is quitably estopped from asserting the public's rights
in the FOL Roads because it had failed to do so for a period of
As a general rule, once a road is dedicated and
twelve yea
abandoned
the public under section 72-5-104(1), subsequent
acts by tt property owner to limit the public's use cannot
change its tatus as a public highway. See Utah Code Ann. § 7 2 2006); Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307,
5-105 (Sup
313 n.12 ( rah 1997) (noting that the fact that the road had not
the public for several years "d[id] not change its
been used
public highway"); Western Kane County Special Serv.
status as
v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377-78 (Utah
Dist. No.
1987) (hoi _ng road was still a public highway although fifty
years had
.ssed since the road was used by the public); Clark v.
Erekson, 9 Jtah 2d 212, 341 P.2d 424, 425-26 (1959) (requiring
landowner j remove encroachments on public highway even though
some of th structures had been in place more than thirty years).
Instead, u ier Utah Code section 72-5-105, "all public highways
. . . once established shall continue to be highways . . . until
abandoned ' s vacated by order." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105(1) .
The Utah S' oreme Court has interpreted the language of this
section to ^equire strict compliance with statutory procedures to
effect an oandonment or vacation of a public road by the
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government.
1974).

See Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595, 597 (Utah

f27 There is no dispute that the Four Roads have not been
abandoned or vacated by order under section 72-5-105(1). Despite
the requirements of that section, "there may be circumstances so
extreme that" the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied
against the government "to prevent the assertion of rights in a
public highway." Western Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1378.
However, to remain "in harmony with the expressed will of the
legislature, which requires that a strict statutory procedure be
followed for the vacation of a public road," courts should be
"extremely reluctant to apply the doctrine of estoppel against
the assertion of rights in a public highway by a government
entity." Id.
i[2 8 To prevail on their claim of equitable estoppel, the
Okelberrys were required to show three elements:
(1) an admission, statement, or act
inconsistent with the claim afterward
asserted,
(2) action by the other party on the faith of
such admission, statement, or act, and
(3) injury to such other party resulting from
allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such admission, statement, or act.
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689, 694
(Utah 1979) . Additionally, when estoppel is asserted against the
government, the admission, statement, or act relied upon must
amount to a "very clear, well-substantiated representation[] by
[the] government entit[y]." Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839
P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992). More specifically, in public roads
cases, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the admission,
statement, or act by the government must be an affirmative
representation. See Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P.
766, 769 (1917) (noting that case was uncommon and suitable for
the application of estoppel because "the municipality by its own
affirmative acts, declarations, and conduct, misled the [property
owner]" (emphasis added)).
12 9 The Okelberrys argue that Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112
Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947), set out a special test for
estoppel against the government in public roads cases whereby
estoppel may be premised on the government's acquiescence in the
private party asserting exclusive control over the roads. We
disagree. The Okelberrys rely on the language in Premium Oil
that states:
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[W]here the public have long withheld the
assertion of control over streets, and
private parties have been . . . induced to
believe the streets abandoned by the public,
. . . with the acquiescence of those
representing the public . . . the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be applied.
Id. at 204 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). However, any
exception created by Premium Oil allowing the assertion of
estoppel against the government in public roads cases, where
reliance is premised on government inaction or acquiescence, was
abrogated by subsequent legislation and case law. Cf. Western
Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1378 ("We are extremely reluctant to
apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in
a public highway by a government entity. This reluctance is in
harmony with the expressed will of the legislature, which
requires that a strict statutory procedure be followed for the
vacation of a public road." (citation omitted)).
f30 At the time Premium Oil was decided in 1947, the law
governing abandonment of a public road was found in Utah Code
section 36-1-3 and stated: "All highways once established must
continue to be highways until abandoned by order of . . .
competent authority." Utah Code Ann. § 36-1-3 (1943) (emphasis
added). Thus, the statute only required that the highway be
"abandoned," and it may have been possible for a private property
owner to reasonably rely on the governments "abandonment" or
acquiescence in private control as an element of an estoppel
claim. See Premium Oil, 187 P.2d at 204. However, in 1963, the
Utah Legislature amended the language of section 36-1-3 6 by
enactment of Utah Code section 27-12-90, which stated: "All
public highways once established shall continue to be highways
until abandoned or vacated by order of . . . competent
authority." Act of 1963, ch. 39, § 90, 1963 Utah Laws 114, 141;
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90 (1969) (emphasis added). In addition
to the "abandoned or vacated" language of the 1963 amendment, the
highway code was also amended in 1965, creating a strict
statutory procedure for "abandon ting] or vacat[ing]" a public
highway. See Act of 1965, ch. 52, §§ 1-5, 1965 Utah Laws 154,
154-56; Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-102.1 to -102.5 (Supp. 1969).
Decisions of the Utah Supreme Court following enactment of these
statutory procedures make it clear that a public highway may only

6. Utah Code section 36-1-3 was renumbered in 1953 to section
27-1-3 without changing the language. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-13 (1953) (amended 1963) .
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be abandoned or vacated when there has been strict statutory
compliance. See Western Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1378; Henderson
v. Osauthorpe, 657 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1982); Ercanbrack, 524
P.2d at 597.
1[31 Thus, under the modern statutes7 and case law, a private
property owner would no longer be able to reasonably rely on the
government's acquiescence in private control to establish a claim
of estoppel. See Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1
v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987)
("[E]stoppel should not be available to circumvent the statutory
process."). Instead, a property owner can only claim reasonable
reliance where the governmental entity has made some affirmative
representation that it intended to abandon or vacate the road in
compliance with the statutory procedure. To hold otherwise would
come dangerously close to recognizing a form of adverse
possession against the government whereby a private party could
obtain equitable rights in a public road merely by exercising
adverse control for a period of time. Utah law expressly
prohibits any person from acquiring rights in a public road by
adverse possession. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13 (2002) .
f32 In this case, there was no evidence that Wasatch made any
representation with respect to the Four Roads, let alone a
representation that the statutory procedures had been or would be
followed to abandon or vacate the Four Roads.8 Instead, the
trial court based its estoppel determination on the fact that
Wasatch acquiesced in the private control by "failing to bring an
action for twelve years." Therefore, we reverse the trial
court's judgment preventing Wasatch from enforcing the public's
rights in the Four Roads.9

7. Utah Code section 27-12-90 was renumbered in 1998 to section
72-5-105(1) and remains substantively unchanged. See Act of
1998, ch. 270, § 133, 1998 Utah Laws 806, 861; Utah Code Ann.
§ 72-5-105 (Supp. 2005) . The current statutory procedure for
abandoning or vacating a public road can be found at Utah Code
section 72-3-108. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108 (2001).
8. Because we hold that the Okelberrys have not met the first
element of a claim for equitable estoppel, we need not address
the remaining elements.
9. Although our holding allows Wasatch to enforce the public's
rights to access the Four Roads, nothing in this opinion should
be read to suggest that the public has obtained any rights,
hunting or otherwise, with respect to the Okelberrys' private
(continued...)
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CONCLUSION
f33 We do not have a firm conviction that the trial court erred
when it determined that the Four Roads were dedicated and
abandoned to the public pursuant to Utah Code section 72-5-104(1)
after having been continuously used as public thoroughfares for a
period of at least ten years. We also conclude that it was
reversible error for the trial court to apply the doctrine of
equitable estoppel against Wasatch's attempts to enforce the
public's rights to use the Four Roads. We therefore affirm in
part and reverse and remand in part for entry of judgment
consistent with this decision.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

H34

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

9. (...continued)
property abutting the roads. On the contrary, members of the
public are only free to travel over the Four Roads and have no
rights, absent permission from the Okelberrys, to enter onto
their land, which remains private.
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